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STATE REJECTION OF FEDERAL LAW
Thomas B. Bennett*
Sometimes the United States Supreme Court speaks, and states do not follow. For
example, in 2003, the Arizona Supreme Court agreed to “reject” a decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court, because no “sound reasons justif[ied] following” it. Similarly, in
2006, Michigan voters approved a ballot initiative that, according to the legislature
that drafted it, sought “at the very least[] to ‘freeze’ the state’s . . . law to prevent” state
courts from following a ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court. Surprising though this
language may be, there is nothing nefarious about these cases. Cooper v. Aaron this
is not. Unlike more notorious attempts by states to reject or nullify federal court
decisions, these state laws and decisions remain in effect. How can this be?
The reason is simple enough: the Supremacy Clause is not a binary switch.
Without complete preemption, our system of federalism leaves room for state law to
supplement or stand alongside federal law. States often use that freedom to depart from
federal law by passing laws or issuing judicial opinions that explicitly reject specific
opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court.
This Article documents and analyzes that phenomenon of state rejection of federal
caselaw, which has not received systematic scholarly attention. Analyzing states’
reactions to three federal cases—Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, Kelo v. City of New
London, and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife—allows for a novel analysis of the
causes and consequences of this phenomenon. These varied examples show that there
is no single explanation for state law rejecting federal law, nor is it even always carried
out by the same institutional actor. Similarly, the pathologies and virtues that result
from divergent state and federal law vary considerably across legal contexts.
That states reject the decisions of federal courts has both practical and theoretical
consequences for our understanding of federal courts’ influence on state law. As a
practical matter, the examples comprise a playbook for state decisionmakers seeking to
extend, supplement, or transcend the limitations of federal law. In an era of increasing
and anticipated clashes between courts and legislatures, rejecting federal caselaw is one
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way that democratic majorities can reduce the practical impact of federal court
decisions.
More broadly, this phenomenon resonates with theoretical accounts of how legal
systems’ rejection of precedent from other jurisdictions can shape domestic law. The act
of defining law aversively to that of another sovereign leaves a lasting mark. States
that reject the decisions of federal courts exhibit difference from federal law as an
important strain of state law. Rejection of federal law therefore sows the seeds of its
own future growth.
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INTRODUCTION
Sometimes the United States Supreme Court speaks, and states do
not follow. For example, in 2003, the Arizona Supreme Court
“reject[ed]” a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, because no “sound
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reasons justif[ied] following” it. 1 Similarly, in 2006, Michigan voters
approved a ballot initiative that, according to the legislature that
drafted it, sought “at the very least[] to ‘freeze’ the state’s . . . law to
prevent” Michigan courts from following a ruling of the U.S. Supreme
Court. 2 Despite their apparent flouting of federal law’s supremacy,
these decisions remain in effect.
That states may reject the decisions of federal courts challenges a
basic view of federalism. Constitutional folklore tells a simple story
about the relation between state and federal law. Federal law is
supreme within its domain. State law is, at most, a junior partner. Even
when state law supplements federal law, it does so on terms set by
federal law. 3 Often these terms take metaphorical form as floors and
ceilings. When federal law sets a floor, state law may go further and set
a higher standard. On the other hand, where federal law sets a ceiling,
state law is barred from imposing alternative or additional restrictions.
This simple view implies a truism: state law cannot trump federal
law.
Or can it? Consider how press reports described Colorado’s
Enhance Law Enforcement Integrity bill, a broad package of police reforms enacted in the wake of sustained activism against police violence
during the summer of 2020. The Denver Post said the bill “removes the
qualified immunity defense.” 4 The Hill said the law “includes the end
of qualified immunity for officers.” 5 U.S. Representative Ayanna
Pressley called on legislators in her state of Massachusetts to follow
Colorado’s lead and “end qualified immunity.” 6 State legislators in

1 Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington, PLC, 75 P.3d 99, 107 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc).
2 Michigan House Fiscal Agency, Ballot Proposal #4 of 2006, https://www.house.mi
.gov/hfa/Archives/PDF/Alpha/Ballot%20Prop4_2006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T4PYBTNZ].
3 Cooperative federalism is the prime example of how classical models of federalism
accounts for the role of state law. See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative
Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695–1703 (2001)
(describing dual federalism in the context of telecommunications regulation).
4 Saja Hindi, Here’s What Colorado’s Police Reform Bill Does, DENVER POST (June 13,
2020), https://www.denverpost.com/2020/06/13/colorado-police-accountability-reformbill/ [https://perma.cc/4PJ3-MB6Y].
5 Brooke Seipel, Colorado Governor Signs Sweeping Police Reform Bill Ending Qualified
Immunity, Banning Chokeholds, THE HILL (June 19, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews
/state-watch/503681-colorado-gov-signs-sweeping-police-reform-bill-ending-qualifiedimmunity [https://perma.cc/E2RD-ANQS].
6 Press Release, Statement from Rep. Pressley on MA Senate Bill that Addresses
Qualified Immunity, Congresswoman Ayanna Pressley, House of Representatives (July 11,
2020), available at https://pressley.house.gov/media/press-releases/statement-rep-pressleyma-senate-bill-addresses-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/FDF5-RLE5].
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New Mexico, New York, and Virginia similarly moved to “eliminat[e]
qualified immunity.” 7
Because the doctrine of qualified immunity is part of federal law,
the simple view of federalism holds that states cannot “end” qualified
immunity. In one sense this objection is correct. As some observers
noted, Colorado’s bill does not purport to alter the application of
qualified immunity as a matter of federal law. 8 Rather, the law creates

7 Rachel Knapp, Legislation to Eliminate ‘Qualified Immunity’ Gets Reworked, KQRE (Feb.
5,
2021),
https://www.krqe.com/news/politics-government/legislature/legislation-toeliminate-qualified-immunity-gets-reworked/
[https://perma.cc/Z9JA-R3MN];
Denis
Slattery, NYS Sen. Myrie Wants to Strip Cops of ‘Qualified Immunity’ That Shields Officers from
Civil Suits, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 25, 2020), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics
/ny-qualified-immunity-zellnor-myrie-police-reform-accountability-20200625-vrxorxh245
blllt2xschbhce3q-story.html [https://perma.cc/23S4-VFCK]; Mel Leonor, Bill to End
Qualified Immunity for Police Clears the House, After Two Democrats Change Their Stances,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Sept. 8, 2020), https://richmond.com/news/state-andregional/govt-and-politics/bill-to-end-qualified-immunity-for-police-clears-the-house-aftertwo-democrats-change-their/article_5c001fc0-371b-563f-a82f-bf58b4783aab.html [https://
perma.cc/Q75L-FP4X].
Other states, perhaps following Colorado’s lead, but in policy directions more dear
to their hearts, have pushed versions of a “Second Amendment Preservation Act,” which
would effectively repeal qualified immunity solely for violations of Second Amendment
rights. See Rebecca Rivas, Missouri GOP Push Bill to Discipline Officers Who ‘Infringe’ on Second
Amendment Rights, MO. INDEP. (Jan. 19, 2021), https://missouriindependent.com/2021/01
/19/missouri-senate-bill-proposes/ [https://perma.cc/B58X-H42Y]; Doug Randall, Second
Amendment Preservation Act Passes Wyoming Committee, KGAB AM 650 (Mar. 18, 2021), https://
kgab.com/second-amendment-preservation-act-passes-wyoming-committee/
[https://
perma.cc/CC4S-6488].
8 See Amanda Pampuro, Colorado Blocks Qualified Immunity for Police, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERV. (June 19, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/colorado-blocks-qualifiedimmunity-for-police/ [https//perma.cc/N3QZ-NULA] (“‘Colorado didn’t necessarily
revoke qualified immunity because the state can’t,’ explained Ben Levin, associate professor
at Colorado Law. ‘What Colorado did in this in this bill, which I think is really creative, it
creates a state cause of action in Colorado State courts, for people whose rights have been
violated under the Colorado State Constitution.’”); Jay Schweikert, Colorado Passes Historic,
Bipartisan Policing Reforms to Eliminate Qualified Immunity, CATO AT LIBERTY (June 22, 2020,
11:31 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/colorado-passes-historic-bipartisan-policing-reforms
-eliminate-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/B6YQ-VR5F] (“While many are
summarizing SB-217 as ‘ending qualified immunity’ in Colorado, what the law formally does
is permit individuals to bring claims against police officers who violate their constitutional
rights under Colorado law. SB-217 is therefore a kind of ‘state analogue’ to Section 1983,
our main federal civil rights statute.”); Ilya Somin, States Can Reform Qualified Immunity on
Their Own, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 26, 2020, 12:21 AM), https://reason.com/volokh
/2020/06/26/states-can-reform-qualified-immunity-on-their-own/
[https://perma.cc
/HKG2-R5GU] (“SB-217 doesn’t technically eliminate qualified immunity as a defense to
lawsuits charging violations of federal constitutional rights. But it effectively achieves the
same goal by eliminating it as an obstacle to lawsuits under the state constitution, which
provides much the same rights.”).
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a state law cause of action analogous to the federal civil rights statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and specifies that qualified immunity will be no
defense to claims under that new provision of state law. 9
Yet in nearly every way that matters, Colorado ended qualified
immunity. 10 Colorado’s constitution protects the same individual
rights as the federal constitution, and its statutory scheme for enforcing those rights matches section 1983—minus qualified immunity.
Anyone aggrieved by unconstitutional police practices in Colorado
may now use state law to sue for money damages without worrying that
qualified immunity will stand in the way. On the other side of the coin,
police now face financial incentives to respect constitutional rights
during their official duties.
This is more than just states going above the floor set by federal
law. In adopting the qualified immunity defense, federal courts saw
themselves as carefully balancing competing values to reach an ideal
legal regime. The Supreme Court’s reasoning rested on a belief that,
absent qualified immunity, the threat of liability would deter police
and other government officials from doing their jobs to the best of
their abilities. 11
States that reject qualified immunity thus challenge the policy
balance struck by federal law in two ways. First, as a practical matter,
those states disrupt the balance by creating a different set of rules and
incentives for government officials within their borders. This disruption is a direct challenge to federal courts’ wisdom in crafting the
qualified immunity doctrine in the first place. Second, states that
reject qualified immunity run an experiment to evaluate empirically
that doctrine’s necessity and efficacy. If those states toss the doctrine
with no great damage to public safety, federal courts will find it harder
to insist on a need to protect government actors through official
9 See Alexander Reinert, Joanna C. Schwartz & James E. Pfander, New Federalism and
Civil Rights Enforcement, 116 NW. L. REV. 1 (2021) (offering a comprehensive account of
state law’s rejection of qualified immunity doctrine).
10 Colorado’s bill does not purport to alter qualified immunity for federal officials
accused of unconstitutional conduct. Any attempt to impose tort liability on federal officers
under state law would have to rely on a new understanding of the Westfall Act, which has
been interpreted, perhaps wrongly, to bar suits for money damages that do not arise directly
under the U.S. Constitution. See Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the
Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 514 (2013)
(explaining that the Westfall Act is commonly assumed “to have preempted all state tort
remedies against federal officials acting within the scope of their authority” but challenging
that view based on the Act’s text and legislative history).
11 See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 223 (1963)
(explaining a traditional justification for discretionary immunity: “if the officer is
answerable, he may hesitate to do what should be done and the government will be the
loser”).
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immunity. For those reasons, these states propose to do more than just
exceed the floor for official liability set by federal law.
This phenomenon of states rejecting federal law is not new, nor is
it limited to qualified immunity. For many years and across many areas
of law, from eminent domain to antitrust, states have intentionally
departed from federal law in ways that challenge the simple metaphor
of floors and ceilings.
This Article documents and analyzes this phenomenon of state
rejection of judge-made federal law, which has not received systematic
scholarly attention. Because it sweeps broadly, this phenomenon
resists easy categories. It manifests in every ideological direction. State
actors choose to reject federal law because of personal ambition,
institutional prerogatives, and genuine policy disagreements. Yet in all
its forms, state rejection of federal law reminds us that simple accounts
of federal judicial supremacy and judicial federalism cannot substitute
for careful analysis of the complex interaction between state and
federal law.
Clarifying the variety of roles that state law can play when it rejects
federal law also provides descriptive grounding for a set of prescriptive
conclusions. These conclusions have bite whether you think federalism matters only instrumentally to other goals or intrinsically as a
constituent part of our structural constitutional order.
First, this phenomenon’s breadth and importance is a reminder
that there are considerable practical and functional limits to the
federal judiciary’s power to displace state law across many policy
domains. For those who care about federalism only instrumentally
because of its impact on policy, this is the key takeaway. It’s old hat to
say that federalism has only fairweather friends. What this Article
shows is that even for fairweather federalists, a more nuanced view of
the relationship between state and federal power will better serve their
policy goals. Particularly in an era where politicians increasingly view
the federal judiciary’s role with skepticism, state law’s ability to reject
and circumvent federal-court rulings should be a primary option for
those seeking to reduce the power of the federal judiciary. 12
Second, there is a converse lesson for those with consistent
ideological views about the best balance of federalism, because crafting
ideal policy given the fact of judicial federalism demands attention to
detail. Judicial opinions often try to set a policy balance between
several competing goals. Yet unless judges are mindful of the
12 Of course, not all celebrate states’ ability to reject Supreme Court decisions. See,
e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 605, 606 n.1 (1981) (“I must confess to some misgivings about the extent to which
some of this commentary seems to assume that state constitutional law is simply ‘available’
to be manipulated to negate Supreme Court decisions which are deemed unsatisfactory.”).
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substantial but uncertain role that state law can play in determining
governing legal rules, that balance can be quickly upset. As the
examples documented below show, state law can variably lock in costs
federal law sought to avoid, provide an end-run around the federal
separation-of-powers scheme, and even effectively displace federal law
altogether. Taking heed of not only the power of state law but also the
uncertainty about how it will take shape should therefore be an
important part of sensible judicial federalism.
To heed this injunction to focus on the details, this Article looks
closely at states’ reactions to three very different U.S. Supreme Court
cases: Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, Kelo v. City of New London, and Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife. These cases established antitrust law’s indirectpurchaser rule, takings law’s broad economic-use justification, and
Article III standing doctrine’s strict tripartite test, respectively. In each
case, some states vigorously rejected the federal precedent, while
others explicitly followed it. In Illinois Brick’s wake, we can sort states
tidily into “repealer” and “non-repealer” states. 13 After Kelo, we can
tot states up based on whether they have rejected an expansive view of
the economic-use justification for exercise of the eminent-domain
power. 14 And post-Lujan, we can map states based on whether they
adopt the tripartite enunciation of standing doctrine. 15 Each example
thus shows how state law can either borrow or reject federal law. 16
These examples also highlight the breadth of state law’s rejection
of federal law. The rejecting actor may be a court, a legislature, or the
electorate; the federal provision may be constitutional or statutory; and
the mechanism for rejection under state law may be constitutional or
statutory. They also vary in the degree of similarity between the texts
of the relevant federal and state laws. In some of these examples, the
texts of the federal and state laws are effectively identical; in others, the

13 See infra Section II.A.
14 See infra Section II.B.
15 See infra Section II.C.
16 The examples discussed here are not the only good illustrations of this
phenomenon. For example, there is at least one other reaction to the Supreme Court’s
antitrust doctrines. See infra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing state efforts to
“repeal” Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 887 (2007)). Beyond
antitrust, there is an ongoing effort by advocates to student speech rights to enact state laws
that reject the doctrine of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), which
held that student newspapers were not public forums for First Amendment purposes. See
Daniel Teehan, Breaking the Back of Hazelwood: A Press Lawyer’s Decade-Long Campaign,
POYNTER (July 17, 2017), https://www.poynter.org/business-work/2017/breaking-the-backof-hazelwood-a-press-lawyers-decade-long-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/3ZV6-6QX8]. This
campaign to “cure Hazelwood” has resulted in new state law in fourteen states. See STUDENT
PRESS LAW CENTER, New Voices, https://splc.org/new-voices/ (conducting national survey)
[https://perma.cc/D6PZ-MF7A].
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texts bear no resemblance. Yet despite these differences, across all
these variables, the same phenomenon appears. Some states borrow
federal law, but many other states reject it.
We can also see what motivates states to reject federal law. A naïve
view might hold that states reject federal law to the extent that they
disagree with federal courts on the meaning or purpose of the law in
question. But the evidence collected here suggests a more nuanced
story. Instead of simple legal or policy disagreement, state actors are
motivated by a combination of political, legal, and institutional factors.
Understanding these complex motivations helps uncover new detail
about our political system.
This Article has three parts. Part I situates the phenomenon of
state rejection of federal law into the disparate literatures on
functional federalism, state constitutional law, and constitutional
borrowing. Part II undertakes a close examination of state rejection of
federal law in context, using reactions to three landmark Supreme
Court cases—Illinois Brick, Kelo, and Lujan—to enrich the story. Part
III analyzes the causes and normative implications of state rejection of
federal law, offering lessons both for those who care about state law’s
difference only instrumentally for other goals as well as those who care
about state policymaking authority for its own right.
I.

SUPREMACY AND METAPHOR

Despite its practical and theoretical importance, state rejection of
federal caselaw has eluded systematic scholarly attention—perhaps
because scholars so often take the Supreme Court’s word as the last
one. While scholars have noted the fact of state law’s difference from
federal law in individual areas of the law—gay rights, say, or civil
procedure—there have been no attempts to describe this phenomenon transsubstantively. But such an account is critical because
common tensions and explanations arise as states reject federal caselaw
across different domains of substantive law.
Instead, three distinct strains of literature, each bearing indirectly
on this phenomenon, have stood apart from one another. First, the
theoretical literature on federalism explores how state and federal
decisionmakers promulgate, interpret, and enforce laws in overlapping spheres of jurisdiction. This literature has developed
sophisticated ways of understanding the relationship between federal
and state law and the officials who administer them. And it has shown
ways in which state actors may not always act to support the goals of
federal law. Yet this literature lacks an account of state lawmaking that
seeks to reject federal decisional law.
Second, there is a growing literature describing state
constitutional law as an underutilized repository of rights that remain
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unrecognized under the federal constitution.
This literature
developing the “underutilization” thesis rightly recognizes the
untapped power of state law to chart its own course. Yet by insisting
on the extent of state constitutional law’s possible difference from
federal constitutional law, it misses the important reasons why states
craft their law in the shadow of federal law.
Third, there is a rich literature on the comparative phenomenon
of constitutional borrowing. This vein of scholarship emphasizes how
sovereigns rely on constitutions from other jurisdictions as models
when framing their own basic law. The borrowing literature also
describes constitutional “non-borrowing,” when sovereigns consider
and reject constitutional provisions adopted by other sovereigns. This
literature has much to teach about how jurisdictions shape their legal
tradition and community by reference to external models. Yet because
it focuses on constitutional drafting rather than interpretation and is
mainly international in its focus, this literature’s application to the
relationship between state and federal law remains unexplored.
This Part examines those three strains of literature in depth to
reveal what conventional wisdom misses about the state law’s tendency
to react to federal law, often by rejecting it.
A. Federalism
The vast literature on American federalism has evolved in step
with the changes in the constitutional allocation of power between
states and the federal government during the twentieth century and
beyond. Just as the constitutional doctrine moved from a belief that
states were separate spheres circumscribing their own sovereign
bailiwicks, to the idea that states are powerful political participants in
the federal system, to the view that federal and state actors cooperate
to implement shared policy—so too did the literature track these
moves.
In recent decades, this literature has developed into two main
camps, each characterized by whether it views the unavoidable
interrelationship between state and federal governments as an evil to
be mitigated or as a path to productive ends. One group, the process
federalists, insists on the political autonomy of states to regulate
independently within the federal system. This view rests, as Heather
Gerken put it, on the premise that states and the federal government
should, like toddlers, engage in “the governance equivalent of parallel
play.” 17 Another group, the cooperative federalists, focuses on how

17

Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1699 (2017).
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overlapping state and federal implementation of shared policy leads to
better outcomes because federal and state actors can share notes,
compete to outperform one another, and serve as mutual backstops. 18
Recent work, perhaps prompted by new political realities, has
recognized the many ways in which states can be uncooperative with
federal law. As Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have
described it, this burgeoning literature rests on a realization that
“states use regulatory power conferred by the federal government to
tweak, challenge, and even dissent from federal law.” 19 An important
strain of this literature—one that is particularly relevant here—sees
states as “dissenters” and state forums as important sites of “dissenting
by deciding.” 20 This work underscores the potential benefits of states
rejecting federal law. Yet by casting state and local actors in the role of
“dissenters,” this literature simultaneously minimizes not only states’
power to shape their own law but also the room that federal law leaves
for states to do so.
Nor do updated accounts of process federalism tell the whole
story. Process federalism is the idea that states have special political
representation in our federal system, which allows them to protect
their autonomy under federal law in real time. This approach pushes
the analysis away from how much power states have as a matter of
constitutional doctrine and federal law and toward the way law
empowers states to protect their interests in the lawmaking process.
That shift in emphasis is useful, but it is limited in that it is static.

18 See ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 339–67 (2011); ROBERT
A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS 92–120 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV.
4, 19 (2009); Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 865 (2006)
(“[I]n this growing universe of regulatory interactions, each agency’s pursuit of its mandate
is shaped—in a non-trivial fashion—by the other entity’s acts of commission or omission.”).
19 Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1259 (2009).
20 See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1750 (2005)
(“Dissenting by deciding fuses the collective act with the public one, allowing electoral
minorities to act collectively at the same moment they act on behalf of the polity.”); Ernest
A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on
Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1290–91 (2004) (“[P]otential dissenters will surely have
more of an impact if they have their own governmental institutions around which to
organize their efforts, as well as their own constitutional space in which to implement and
demonstrate the effectiveness of alternative policies.”); Matthew C. Porterfield, State and
Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of
Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–2 (1999).
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Process federalism’s focus trains on the legislative process; once a bill
becomes law, process has run out. 21
A richer view would paint the relationship between federal and
state lawmaking as an ongoing process, with moves and countermoves.
In other words, if Gerken is right that process federalism insists on the
governance equivalent of parallel play, a sophisticated account would
describe the moves in a sequential game. The next step, then, is an
account of how states react to changes in federal law.
B. State Constitutional Law and the New Judicial Federalism
The literature on state constitutional law treats state law’s
difference as an underutilized or even forgotten source of rights. 22
These laments typically focus on state constitutions as repositories of
positive rights that can and should be used to expand individual

21 Often, the outcome of the legislative settlement cannot be known until a particular
statute is administered and applied, meaning that both cooperative federalism and process
federalism recognize the sector-specific nature of federal-state arrangements. See, e.g.,
Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125,
2128 (2009) (“[A] wise strategy would be to embrace the primacy of federal agencies and
to focus on reforming them to ensure they can become a rich forum for participation by
state governmental entities.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism,
57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2028 (2008) (arguing that administrative law is the best vehicle for courts
to address federalism concerns).
22 See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174–78 (2018) (arguing against “lockstepping,” “the
tendency of some state courts to diminish their constitutions by interpreting them in
reflexive imitation of the federal courts’ interpretation of the Federal Constitution”);
Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 339
(2011) (noting the same phenomenon decried by Judge Sutton); Helen Hershkoff &
Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and the Constitutional Socio-Economic Rights: Exploring the
Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 923, 970 (2011); Erwin Chemerinsky, Two
Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1696 (2010) (“[S]tate
constitutional law is a necessary, but inadequate second best to advancing individual
liberties when that cannot be accomplished under the United States Constitution.”); Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1833, 1839 (2001) (analyzing and praising the variation in state courts’ justiciability
rules) [hereinafter Hershkoff, State Courts]; Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State
Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1132–35 (1999)
[hereinafter Hershkoff, Positive Rights]; James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 766 (1992) (“[T]o the extent that . . . a state
constitutional discourse exists, its terms and conventions are often borrowed wholesale
from federal constitutional discourse, as though the language of federal constitutional law
were some sort of lingua franca of constitutional argument generally.”); William J. Brennan,
Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual
Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
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liberties and better achieve federalism’s promise. State constitutions
have rejected the federal constitution’s failure to grant positive
rights—this story goes—and that rejection is an important source of
individual freedom.
Much of this literature focuses on the possibility that state
constitutions do or could guarantee socioeconomic—or “positive”—
rights. 23 For example, states recognize rights to education, welfare,
housing, and a healthy environment. 24 One recent form of this
argument suggests that state constitutions contain pro-democracy
guarantees that can counter democratic decline. 25 These accounts see
state constitutional law as potentially orthogonal to federal
constitutional law. State constitutional rights could guarantee public
goods that the federal constitutional does not cover, rather than
protecting the same rights in a more expansive way.
Another vein of this literature sees state constitutions as a way to
expand fundamental rights that exist in limited form under the federal
constitution, most notably gay marriage, abortion access, and criminal
procedure. This scholarship concerns itself with what it calls, now
anachronistically, the “new judicial federalism.” 26 For example, before
the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in United States v. Windsor and
Obergefell v. Hodges, 27 scholars sought to understand why state
constitutional law took a different approach to gay marriage than did

23 See, e.g., Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 22, at 927–30 (cataloguing such rights in
state constitutions).
24 See HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR 3 & nn.29–
31, 4 & nn.32–33 (1997).
25 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in State
Constitutions, 119 MICH. L. REV. 859, 861 (2021).
26 See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008) (cataloguing the “new judicial federalism” in areas of equal
protection and due process); G. Alan Tarr, The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism,
24 PUBLIUS 63 (1994) (setting out the history of the “new judicial federalism” but
expressing agnosticism about its future); Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and
Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a Response, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 863 (1991) (tackling the issue
in the area of criminal procedure).
27 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (striking down Section 3 of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (holding that
gay couples have a fundamental right to marry).
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the federal constitution. 28 A similar literature seeks to analyze the role
of state constitutional law in protecting reproductive freedom. 29
This literature leaves open two big questions. First, because it
looks only at state constitutional rights as interpreted by state courts, it
overlooks how states can reject the decisions of federal courts through
statutes or constitutional amendments. (Indeed, much of the state
constitutional law and new judicial federalism literature sees the
mutability of state constitutions as a limit on their promise of
individual rights. 30) And while state courts have an important role to
play in rejecting federal caselaw, state legislatures and electoral
constituencies have an equally important role to play.
Second, this literature’s focus on state constitutional rights only
makes sense if state law is in fact meaningfully different from federal
law—a difference that rejection necessarily brings about. So a key
premise of this literature is that state law does in fact vary substantially
from federal law. After all, if state law largely resembled federal law,
or followed it in lockstep, there would be nothing to gain from
examining state law’s experimentation or difference. A series of
fundamental questions, then, centers on how much state law grows in
the shadow of federal law. How often does state law explicitly borrow

28 See, e.g., Arthur Lupia, Yanna Krupnikov, Adam Seth Levine, Spencer Piston &
Alexander Von Hagen-Jamar, Why State Constitutions Differ in Their Treatment of Same-Sex
Marriage, 72 J. POL. 1222 (2010) (providing empirical evidence that variation in state
constitutional protections for gay marriage is best explained by a combination of local
political preferences and institutional differences); James A. Gardner, State Constitutional
Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO.
L.J. 1003 (2003) (arguing that recognition of individual rights by state courts serves as a
check on the “tyranny” of overly restrictive U.S. Supreme Court rulings in several areas,
including gay rights); Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus nor Ostrich: State Constitutions
as an Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833 (2004) (arguing that gay
rights, among other individual rights, illustrate the importance of judicial federalism to
personal liberty).
29 See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Constitutional Rights in Kansas After Hodes & Nauser, 68 U.
KAN. L. REV. 743 (2020) (tracing protections for abortion access under Kansas’s
constitution); Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v.
Casey: Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1151
(1993); Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection for Abortion
Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469 (2009); Martha M.
Ezzard, State Constitutional Privacy Rights Post Webster—Broader Protection Against Abortion
Restrictions?, 67 DENV. U. L. REV. 401 (1990).
30 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 28, at 1852–54 (“The relative ease in amending state
constitutions to overturn unpopular state constitutional decisions reveals a fundamental
paradox of state constitutional law: State constitutions are, in theory, supposed to provide
fundamental rights, yet those rights often can be overridden by majority vote.”).
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or reject federal law? What drives this relationship? Yet the literature
lacks a systematic account of state law’s rejection of federal law. 31
C. Constitutional Borrowing
Another vein of scholarship focuses on the obverse side of the
rejection coin: “constitutional borrowing.” 32 This branch of the comparative literature highlights ways in which constitutional drafters may
look to, rely on, and explicitly incorporate other sovereigns’
constitutional texts when framing their own founding documents. In
so doing, it points up similarities across jurisdictions and emphasizes
the shared project of constitutional drafting, even when drafters arrive
at the task with different politics, legal cultures, and histories. To a
limited extent, scholars in this vein have also called for greater
attention to the practice of constitutional “nonborrowing”: times when
sovereigns consider and explicitly reject model constitutional text
taken from another sovereign. 33 Central to this story of nonborrowing
is the way that an oppositional stance to an alternate model becomes
embedded in the interpretive norms of the nonborrowing sovereign. 34
Though this literature is rich, it is limited in two ways because it
focuses on international borrowing of constitutional text. First, because
it focused first on borrowing across national boundaries, the constitutional borrowing literature needed adapting to the domestic context.
Second, this literature focused on constitutional drafting rather than
interpretation, text rather than doctrine. This limitation is significant
because text underdetermines doctrine in many ways. We must give
more focus to doctrinal borrowing.
To meet this need, scholars have sought to apply insights from the
constitutional borrowing literature to the domain of domestic federal
31 A rare but limited exception is Lupia et al., supra note 28 (analyzing state
constitutional amendments regarding gay marriage after the Supreme Court decided
Bowers v. Hardwick, but not analyzing whether state laws involved rejecting Bowers).
32 See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional Borrowing and Nonborrowing, 1 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 196 (2003); Frederick Schauer, On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 CONN.
L. REV. 907 (2005); Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the
Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640 (1999); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993).
33 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for
Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 298
(2003) (“[R]ejecting a constitutional option may be in some ways more crucial to the
development of a constitutional sensibility than positively adopting a particular institutional
design or constitutional clause.”); Wiktor Osiatynski, Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowing, 1
INT’L J. CONST. L. 244, 250 (2003) (considering instances comparative constitutional
“rejections”: “when the drafters consider an idea or provisions and decide not to borrow”).
34 See Scheppele, supra note 33, at 298.
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constitutional doctrine. 35 Yet here too much of the focus is on borrowing doctrinal rules from one area of federal constitutional law and
deploying them in another. This literature largely fails to consider
borrowing of or by subconstitutional law, and its insights have rarely
been applied to the relationship between federal and state law. 36
Other scholars have focused on ways in which state constitutions
model themselves upon and borrow from one another. 37 Though this
literature treats state constitutional law as a mutual project among
many states, it largely treats state and federal constitutional law as
distinct domains. When scholars do link those two domains, it is typically to note that federal constitutional law shapes state constitutional
law, as with the elegiac underutilization thesis.
In this vein, scholars have traced how state law borrows doctrine
from federal law. Scott Dodson has called this phenomenon federal
law’s “gravitational force.” 38 The idea here is that state actors are
significantly more likely to adopt federal law than its underlying merit
would suggest. This gravitational force, Dodson argues, is not overwhelming, but it is persistent and strong. Yet Dodson conceives of
federal law’s sway in purely attractive terms. For him, state law deviating
from federal law ironically proves that federal law keeps state law in its
orbit. 39 So here, too, we find no systematic treatment of state rejection
of federal doctrine.
35 See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459
(2010); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
36 Of course, attention has been given to the borrowing of common law rules across
jurisdictions. But that is a different phenomenon because it is an exercise of direct
lawmaking.
37 See Marsha L. Baum & Christian G. Fritz, American Constitution-Making: The Neglected
State Constitutional Sources, 27 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 199, 207–08 (2000); see also G. ALAN TARR
& MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION (1988);
James N.G. Cauthen, Horizontal Federalism in the New Judicial Federalism: A Preliminary Look
at Citations, 66 ALB. L. REV. 783, 790–94 (2003) (documenting the frequency of interstate
citations regarding the meaning of state constitutional law); Lawrence M. Friedman, Robert
A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright & Stanton Wheeler, State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 794–810 (1981); Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream: An
Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law,
13 VT. L. REV. 13, 23 (1988).
As Bulman-Pozen and Seifter note, some state courts encourage litigants before
them to cite to relevant out-of-state decisions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586
A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991); State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 237 (Vt. 1985); see also Bulman-Pozen
& Seifter, supra note 25, at 867 n.9.
38 See Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 704, 705–
06 (2016).
39 See id. at 717 (“Those state courts that follow simply go with the flow. State courts
that resist struggle to do so. The reason is the same: the gravitational force of the Supreme
Court’s decisions pulls them in.”).
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An account of this phenomenon is critical to understanding the
relation between federal and state law. By synthesizing both rejection
and borrowing of federal law, we see a clearer picture of the
relationship between state and federal law. This synthesis shows that
the more appropriate metaphor for the relationship is not gravity but
electromagnetism. Under normal conditions, gravity is a purely
attractive force: it only ever draws objects together. By contrast,
electromagnetic forces can either attract or repulse, depending on the
matter’s charge. 40
Federal law, too, has a repellent force along with its attractive one,
as this Article documents. States often enthusiastically reject federal
laws or judicial opinions they do not like. To overlook this repulsive
force of federal law on state law is to misunderstand the dynamic
relationship between state and federal law. It is not the case that state
law diverges from federal law only through great effort, like a rocket
burning fuel to reach exit velocity. 41 As the evidence gathered here
shows, state law can eagerly reject federal law. 42
The possibility of rejection does not reduce the influence of
federal law on state law, but reflects it in another way. That states are
free to reject federal law does not mean they are free from the
influence of federal law. In formal terms, federal law sets the agenda
for state actors and forces them to take an up-or-down vote. 43 This
Article shows that state actors have a real choice about whether to
follow federal law, and they often exercise that choice by rejecting the
federal model. Yet it also shows that state actors often do not have
meaningful choice about whether to face the same doctrinal questions
that federal courts have faced, because federal law forces the issue.

40 Oppositely charged particles will attract under the influence of electromagnetic
forces, much like two massive bodies will attract under the influence of gravity. But similarly
charged particles repel one another. Stated in terms of fields, gravitational fields exhibit
no polarity, while electrical and magnetic fields have polarity. Whereas both gravitational
and electromagnetic fields can exert strong influence and rearrange matter under their
sway, only electromagnetic fields exert that influence including by repelling matter.
41 But see Dodson, supra note 38, at 717.
42 In this way, the phenomenon is related to what Kim Lane Scheppele has called
“cross-constitutional influence”: the way in which new constitutional questions “can be
influenced positively or negatively by constitutional regimes that have confronted those
issues before.” Scheppele, supra note 33, at 297.
43 See Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
947, 948 (1962) (theorizing that power inheres not only in A’s ability directly to influence
B’s choices but also in A’s ability to control the set of decisions considered by or presented
to B); see also STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 16 (1st ed. 1974) (distinguishing
between mobilization of bias that robs B of the power to set the agenda and mobilization
of bias that transforms B’s preferences altogether).
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When federal law decides an issue, state actors can decide it
differently—but they often cannot dodge it altogether.
Rejection also matters in a more profound way. Avoiding bad
models is a driving motivation of politics and lawmaking. 44 The U.S.
Constitution sought to avoid the ills of the Articles of Confederation.
Scholars argue that the Fourth Amendment is a repudiation of British
use of writs of assistance during the colonial era. 45 Similarly, as Jamal
Greene has shown, discredited cases can remain useful because of their
ability to spark discourse about the future path of the law. 46
Because rejection drives lawmakers, its residue is indelible.
Rejection exerts an enduring influence on legal communities. 47 It
structures future legal thinking, serves as touchpoint in legal debates,
and demands distinguishing in legal arguments. And rejection offers
insight into law’s meaning regardless of one’s preferred methodology,
because it can go to the root of textual or original meaning. Understanding rejection, then, is key to understanding the path of the law.
II.

STATE REJECTION IN PRACTICE

To show more concretely how state law reacts both positively and
negatively to federal judicial decisions, let us turn to a trio of examples.
44 See William E. Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM
3, 22–24 (William E. Connolly ed., 1969) (defining “contrast-models” as those we use
negatively to define our own); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence,
Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 113 (2005) (“Constitutions can also provide
a basis for resistance to, or differentiation from, foreign law or practice.”); Scheppele, supra
note 33, at 298 (“I want to call attention to the cases where rejection or refusal are
significant in the sense that constitutional builders may have constructed an important
notion of what the choice means around avoiding a particular alternative rather than being
affirmatively drawn to a positive vision.”); see also David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1636 (2009) (“A lengthy tradition in American law looks to the
Continental, inquisitorial system of criminal adjudication for negative guidance about our
own ideals. Avoiding inquisitorialism is taken to be a core commitment of our legal
heritage.”).
45 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 129–
136 (1st ed. 2017) (documenting how the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement was
a response to general writs of assistance and their use in Paxton’s Case).
46 See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 461–62 (2011) (“The
anticanon, then, is normatively unstable. It is a space in which diverse participants in
constitutional debate work out mutually eligible but competing ethical commitments.”).
47 See id.; Sklansky, supra note 44. For an insightful take on the concept of
“constitutional communities” in the context of state law, see Miriam Seifter, Extra-Judicial
Capacity, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 385, 392 (2020) (“By shaping legal meanings and suggesting legal
boundaries, experts might serve as a sort of stabilizing force in the law. It is experts who
decide on a canon and anti-canon. It is experts who decide which ideas are ‘on the wall’ or
‘off the wall.’”) (internal footnote omitted).
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These examples, taken from disparate areas of the law, reflect how the
broad pattern of state rejection of federal law can manifest through
different institutional actors interpreting or amending different types
of legal provisions. These different contexts have important consequences for how we evaluate the costs and benefits of state rejection of
federal law. In some cases, we may see state law’s difference as a
benefit, allowing experimentation and localization. In other cases,
state law’s difference creates idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies that
undermine beneficial uniformity. The surprisingly similar causes of
state law’s rejection of federal law can obscure the varied costs and
benefits that accrue in different contexts. 48 But those costs and
benefits determine when and how we should deploy tools to encourage
or limit state law to depart from federal law. For those reasons, it is
important to evaluate the phenomenon of state law’s rejection of
federal law in context and in detail.
This Part does that job by considering three developments in
federal doctrine that drove reactions in state law. First, it considers the
Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois to limit civil suits
under the Clayton Act alleging an overcharge to only “direct
purchasers” of goods and services. States widely rejected this decision,
mostly legislatively but also judicially in a few cases. Second, this Part
considers state responses to the Supreme Court’s expansive reading of
the economic-use justification for eminent domain in Kelo v. City of New
London. State legislatures and courts rejected this decision too—even
though the aggravating federal decision was a matter of federal
constitutional (not statutory) law that was therefore applicable to states
as well as the federal government. Finally, we turn to the Supreme
Court’s enunciation of a rigid tripartite test for standing to sue in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife. This decision, unlike Illinois Brick and Kelo, was
popular among states, many of whom accepted it wholesale into state
law despite the lack of analogous constitutional text. But in several
states, that acceptance merely laid the groundwork for future rejection
of the federal doctrine, showing how federal law can breed instability
and relitigation of settled state precedent.
A. Textual Congruence, Doctrinal Divergence: The Indirect-Purchaser Rule
Text is not destiny. Rather, the text of a statute or constitutional
provision is a starting condition in a function that determines legal
meaning. That path-dependent function may include a range of other
variables that influence the ultimate content of the law: legal

48

See supra Part I.
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interpretation, politics, and economic circumstances. That is why
identical legal texts do not guarantee identical law.
State statutes patterned off federal statutes show well how text
underdetermines legal meaning. Such state statutes are common, and
include laws barring unfair and deceptive practices and anticompetitive conduct as well as laws authorizing whistleblower suits to
combat fraud against the government. Because they highlight clearly
how state law can reject federal judicial decisions, my focus here is on
antitrust laws.
Antitrust laws exist at both the federal and state levels, and these
statutes’ text is surprisingly similar. 49 Many state antitrust laws follow
either federal antitrust laws or uniform state model antitrust laws, and
both federal and state antitrust laws borrow heavily from the earlier
common law. 50 Because of that shared lineage, the text and meaning
of many antitrust laws is identical.
But this similarity among state and federal antitrust laws emerges
from contingent history, and allocative choices about who decides
what the content of substantive antitrust law should be erode that
similarity. Start with how the federal system divides up responsibility
for enacting antitrust laws. Federal antitrust statutes come from
Congress, while their state analogs come from state legislatures. Then
consider who enforces these statutes. Federal antitrust laws have
multiple enforcers: not only two different federal agencies—the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission—but also
private plaintiffs suing to remedy their own injuries. Likewise, state
antitrust laws have multiple enforcers: not only the state’s attorney
general but also private plaintiffs. Finally, consider who interprets
antitrust statutes and decides antitrust cases. Federal antitrust claims
are exclusively within the purview of federal courts; state courts are
barred by statute from hearing them. By contrast, plaintiffs can not
only file state antitrust claims in state court, but also steer them to
federal court by bundling them with federal claims or ensuring
complete diversity exists.
Maintaining uniform interpretation of antitrust laws, even given
identical statutory text, therefore requires one of two things: (1) a
commitment to lockstep interpretation by state actors, including both
legislators and judges; or (2) consensus among the relevant federal
49 Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 379–84
(1983) (discussing how changes in federal legislative power under the Commerce Clause
and changes in the subject matter and personal jurisdiction of state courts impact the scope
of federal and state antitrust remedies).
50 See, e.g., UNIF. STATE ANTITRUST ACT (1973); see also, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (exploring the relationship between state and
federal antitrust law in the early period).
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and state decisionmakers about what the best antitrust rules are.
Neither is the case. Indeed, it is precisely because there is deep disagreement about ideal antitrust policy that there is unlikely to be a
stable, long-term commitment to lockstep interpretation of the various
antitrust laws.
To be sure, interpretation of state antitrust laws in lockstep with
their federal counterparts is how this story starts. Many states explicitly
codified their policy of hitching the interpretation of their own laws to
the interpretation given to federal antitrust laws by federal judges. 51
And for many years, roughly from the Progressive Era through the
collapse of the New Deal consensus, the lockstep continued.
Illinois Brick changed all that. That case asked whether a private
antitrust plaintiff who was an indirect customer of the defendant and
was injured by an alleged overcharge had a valid cause of action under
section 4 of the Clayton Act. 52 In other words, may an ordinary
consumer sue a manufacturer for violating antitrust laws if she bought
the defendant’s products from an intermediary rather than directly
from the defendant? 53
The case for allowing such suits is compelling. The text of the
Clayton Act provides that “any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefor.” 54 No distinction between direct and indirect
purchasers appears anywhere in the statute. There is also an economic
reason—though a disputed one—to allow such suits: monopolies or
cartels may pass on supracompetitive prices to their downstream
retailers, who in turn will pass them onto consumers. 55
The Supreme Court, however, answered the question in the
negative, holding that only direct purchasers may sue under the
federal antitrust laws. Illinois Brick reflects a desire to avoid duplicative
damage awards and thorny disputes about how to apportion such
awards among plaintiffs at different stages of the supply chain. 56 And
to some extent, the outcome in Illinois Brick was compelled by a prior
51 See, e.g., infra note 75 and accompanying text.
52 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977).
53 In Illinois Brick, the consumer was the state of Illinois, who had purchased some of
the defendants’ concrete blocks through contractor intermediaries. See id.
54 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (emphasis added).
55 See, e.g., Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 749 & n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n many
instances, the brunt of antitrust injuries is borne by indirect purchasers, often ultimate
consumers of a product, as increased costs are passed along the chain of distribution.”)
(citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS
147–49 (1st ed. 1974)).
56 See id. at 737 (discussing, among other problems, the need for compulsory joinder
of classes of potential plaintiffs at each stage of the supply chain).
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decision that had barred defendants from raising as a defense the
argument that a direct-purchaser plaintiff had passed on any
supracompetitive prices to the end consumer. 57 Yet despite these
reasons, the Court’s reading of the Clayton Act contradicted not only
the substantial agreement in lower courts and the academy but also the
position of the United States as amicus curiae. 58
After Illinois Brick, many state legislators and judges began to
rethink the wisdom of lockstep interpretation of state and federal antitrust laws. The ensuing state-law backlash to Illinois Brick continues:
thirty-five states plus the District of Columbia have either altered or
read state law to reject the direct-purchaser requirement in one form
or another. 59 The Supreme Court has even blessed this broad rejection

57 See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968)
(holding invalid, in a case brought by a direct purchaser, the defense that indirect
purchasers were the true parties injured by antitrust claims).
58 See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 729 (acknowledging these contrary authorities); id. at
753 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting scholarly support). The most devastating
criticism of the Illinois Brick rule is that it assumes an incorrect measure of antitrust damages.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 16.6d (4th ed. 2011) (detailing the twin mistakes of equating the elasticity of
substitution for direct and indirect purchasers, on the one hand, and believing that the
measure of an indirect purchaser’s damages would necessarily be derivative of the direct
purchaser’s damages). Professor Hovenkamp summarizes: “(a) the intermediary’s injury is
not measured by an ‘overcharge’ at all, but by lost profits; [and] (b) the indirect purchaser’s
damage can ordinarily be measured without reference to the amount ‘passed on’ by the
intermediary.” Id.; see also Thomas A. Lambert, Tweaking Antitrust’s Business Model, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 153, 185–87 (2006) (book review) (summarizing Hovenkamp’s critique).
59 See STATE ILLINOIS BRICK REPEALER LAWS CHART, PRACTICAL LAW CHECKLIST 8-5216152 (West 2021). There is a wide degree of variation in the scope and form of Illinois Brick
repealer statutes and decisions. Some limit the right of recovery for harm to indirect
purchasers to the state attorney general, while others allow indirect-purchaser recovery only
under state Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act statutes (i.e., Baby FTC Acts). There is
a related question whether states have amended their law to treat retail price maintenance
as a per se violation of antitrust law, in direct rejection of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles
Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911), which had imposed a per se rule).
See Michael A. Lindsay, Overview of State RPM, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Apr. 2017), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/lindsay_chart
.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GDS-CMUQ] (collecting and categorizing state
antitrust provisions). This is a conceptually distinct example of state rejection of federal
law, albeit one that did not progress as far as the reaction to Illinois Brick did. See Leiv Blad
& Margaret Sheer, A Look Back at the Attempts to Repeal Leegin, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Nov.
2013, at 2, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/a-look-back-at-the-attempts-torepeal-leegin/ [https://perma.cc/D576-KKWS].
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of Illinois Brick by upholding one of these “repealer” statutes against a
preemption challenge. 60
These repealer statutes and decisions reveal concentric
complexities about our federalism. Legislatures responding to court
decisions by amending the text of statutes is a familiar story among the
federal branches. 61 Think here of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, an explicit legislative override of a Supreme Court case decided
two years earlier. 62 But the same phenomenon can play out across the
federal-state barrier, especially when federal law explicitly reserves for
states an important role in regulating a particular area of law.
The Illinois Brick saga shows us that state rejection need not be the
end of the story. In the recent case of Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Supreme
Court relied upon the experience of states that rejected Illinois Brick in
limiting that doctrine’s scope at the federal level. 63 While the dissent
in that case criticized the Court for “whittling [Illinois Brick] away to a
bare formalism,” this Section illustrates that it would be more accurate
to level the accusation at state courts and legislatures. 64
1. California
When the Supreme Court decided Illinois Brick, California’s state
antitrust law—the Cartwright Act—was interpreted in lockstep with
federal caselaw interpreting federal antitrust laws. 65 That lockstepping
is no surprise given that state lawmakers patterned the Cartwright Act

60 See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 103 (1989) (“It is one thing to
consider the congressional policies identified in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe in defining
what sort of recovery federal antitrust law authorizes; it is something altogether different,
and in our view inappropriate, to consider them as defining what federal law allows States
to do under their own antitrust law.”).
61 See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2014)
(cataloguing this phenomenon empirically); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
62 See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, 2000e–5); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550
U.S. 618 (2007).
63 See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1525 (2019) (citing Professors Areeda and
Professor Hovenkamp’s treatise and canvassing the objections discussed); see HOVENKAMP,
supra note 58.
64 Id. at 1531 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
65 See, e.g., Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., 444 P.2d 481, 487 (Cal. 1968)
(federal antitrust cases “applicable” to interpretation of the Cartwright Act); Shasta Douglas
Oil Co. v. Work, 28 Cal. Rptr. 190, 195 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (federal antitrust cases
“authoritative” to courts interpreting Cartwright Act).
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after the federal Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. 66 Many provisions of
the Cartwright Act parroted the Sherman Act identically. In this sense,
both the federal antitrust laws—including the Clayton Act of 1914, the
statute that Illinois Brick purported to interpret—and the California
Cartwright Act reflected the trust-busting sentiment of the era. 67 In
the presidential election of 1888, for example, both major parties
included anti-trust planks in their official platforms. 68
Shared policy preferences at a moment in time can warrant
adopting identical statutory text, and in turn identical text can lead to
federal-state lockstepping. But the instability of such agreement
creates pressure for one legislature or another to amend its laws as
soon as policy disagreement manifests. So it was in California: whatever agreement or shared sympathy might have existed between the
Congress of 1890 and the California legislature of 1907, it had disappeared by 1977. And because the California legislature disapproved of
the decision in Illinois Brick, the lockstep approach posed a threat.
Recognizing this threat, the legislature acted almost immediately
to amend the Cartwright Act by passing what we now call an Illinois
Brick repealer statute. 69 The ensuing bill clarified that a cause of action
existed under California antitrust law “regardless of whether [the
plaintiff] dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant.” 70 The bill
passed unanimously and became law the summer after the Supreme

66 See Marin Cnty. Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 549 P.2d 833, 835 (Cal. 1976) (“A
long line of California cases has concluded that the Cartwright Act is patterned after the
Sherman Act and both statutes have their roots in the common law. Consequently, federal
cases interpreting the Sherman Act are applicable to problems arising under the Cartwright
Act.”) (collecting cases).
67 The Sherman Act passed unanimously in the House and 52–1 in the Senate. See
George J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1985). The vigor for
antitrust enforcement increased in the twenty years after its enactment. Id. at 4 (“My main
focus is on the first twenty years of the Sherman Act. In that period, to repeat, the vigor of
enforcement of the act grew . . . .”).
68 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 1888 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (June 5, 1888), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1888-democraticparty-platform [https://perma.cc/SL6R-ZUWQ]; Republican Nat’l Comm., Republican
Party Platform of 1888, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 19, 1888), https://www.presidency
.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1888 [https://perma.cc/VCR4-K2ES].
69 Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 233 P.3d 1066, 1082 n.18 (Cal. 2010) (stating that bill was
designed “to prevent a federal case interpretation of the Sherman Act precluding an
indirect purchaser’s standing to sue in antitrust actions being applied to actions under the
Cartwright Act” (quoting S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Analysis of Assemb. Bill 3222 (1977–
1978 Reg. Sess.), at 1 (Mar. 27, 1978))); see also id. at 2 (noting that the bill was necessary
because federal caselaw was “considered ‘persuasive’ in interpreting the provisions of the
Cartwright Act”).
70 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 16750(a); see also 1978 Cal. Stat. 1693.
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Court decided Illinois Brick. 71 California thus became the first state to
“repeal” (reject) Illinois Brick as a matter of state law. 72
2. Arizona
While many other states followed California’s lead and repealed
Illinois Brick by statute, other states did so by judicial interpretation of
state antitrust statutes—despite textual similarities between their own
state antitrust laws and the Clayton Act. This is an example of textual
congruence but doctrinal divergence: different judiciaries walking
different paths.
Arizona is a good example of this form of state rejection of Illinois
Brick. In Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington, PLC, an antitrust defendant
urged the Arizona Supreme Court to adopt Illinois Brick’s ban on
indirect purchaser suits as a gloss on the Arizona Antitrust Act, whose
text is “almost identical[]” to that of the Clayton Act. 73 In particular,
the antitrust defendants in the case argued that by enacting a state
antitrust law whose text was almost identical to that of the Clayton Act
provision at issue in Illinois Brick, “the legislature expressed its desire
that Arizona courts apply Illinois Brick and similarly preclude indirect
purchasers from suing under the Arizona statute.” 74
The Arizona Antitrust Act of 1974 became law three years before
Illinois Brick. 75 It follows the Uniform State Antitrust Act of 1973
closely. Like the Uniform Act, the Arizona statute contained a harmonization clause, directing that it should be interpreted in harmony not
only with other states’ antitrust laws but also with the federal antitrust
laws. 76 Based on that harmonization clause, the defendants argued
that the Arizona legislature had manifested intent that Arizona should

71 See 1978 Cal. Stat. 1693 (statute filed with the Secretary of State Aug. 25, 1978).
72 Alabama was the first to pass a statute allowing indirect purchaser suits, but it did
so two years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Brick. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a)
(1975) (allowing recovery of damages caused by “an unlawful trust, combine, or monopoly,
or its effect, direct or indirect” (emphasis added)).
73 75 P.3d 99, 102 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1408(B)
(1974) (creating private cause of action for antitrust injury).
74 Bunker’s Glass Co., 75 P.3d at 102.
75 Id.
76 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1412 (“This article shall be applied and construed to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this
article among those states that enact it. It is the intent of the legislature that in construing
this article, the courts may use as a guide interpretations given by the federal courts to
comparable federal antitrust statutes.”); see also UNIF. STATE ANTITRUST ACT, 7C U.L.A.
§ 12, at 369 (2000).
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adopt future federal judicial interpretations of the Clayton Act,
including Illinois Brick. 77
The Arizona Supreme Court declined to do so and instead
rejected Illinois Brick as a matter of state law. Its decision rested on
both textual and policy arguments. As to text, the court noted that
nothing in the provision creating a private cause of action purported
to limit recovery to direct purchasers. 78 The court also reasoned that
the harmonization clause pointed in different directions. 79 To harmonize the law with state antitrust laws would generally require allowing
indirect-purchaser suits, while to harmonize it with federal antitrust laws
would seem to require barring them. But even there, the text of the
harmonization clause was permissive rather than mandatory (“the
courts may use as a guide . . .” 80). And in any event, the harmonization
clause predated Illinois Brick, so divining legislative intent for that
unforeseen development would have been especially difficult. 81
Moving beyond text to policy, as is typical with common-law
statutes like antitrust laws, the court was unpersuaded by the logic of
Illinois Brick. The court rejected that case’s twin fears of complex
damages questions and the specter of double recovery. Instead, the
court agreed that lower courts were competent to manage the oftentricky questions that indirect-purchaser suits can pose. 82 In part, this
confidence stemmed from time and experience. For example, the
court recognized that “recent developments in multistate litigation
show that plaintiffs may be able to produce satisfactory proof of
damages.” 83
The dissent argued that the legislature had manifested a
preference for uniformity, and that the only possible and worthwhile
type of uniformity is with federal law. 84 The majority’s decision to
depart from federal caselaw, the dissent argued, rendered contestable
a wide range of antitrust doctrines previously considered settled:
Apparently we now will interpret some provisions of the Arizona
Antitrust Act consistently with federal law and, in other instances,
disregard federal law, as we do today. The majority does not
77 Bunker’s Glass, 75 P.3d at 102.
78 See id. at 107.
79 See id. at 105.
80 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1412 (2021) (emphasis added).
81 See Bunker’s Glass, at 103–07.
82 Id. at 107–09.
83 Id. at 109 (citing In re S.D. Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 657 N.W.2d 668, 679 (S.D.
2003)).
84 Id. at 111 (McGregor, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent noted that only three
other states had adopted the Uniform Act, and that all had modified it in various ways so as
to render them non-uniform from one another. Id.
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[say] . . . how to discern which rule applies to any particular
antitrust issue, a result that creates unnecessary and harmful
uncertainty. 85

The majority’s response to the dissent emphasized a key factor
driving state law’s rejection of federal law: the different incentives and
constituencies that guide federal and state judiciaries:
The concerns that motivate the federal government at times differ
from those that motivate state legislatures. While the Supreme
Court may have wished to protect federal courts from the burden
of resolving nationwide class actions potentially involving hundreds
of thousands of indirect purchaser plaintiffs, this court is confident
that Arizona’s courts are up to the task . . . . 86

The disagreement between the majority and dissent in Bunker’s
Glass thus reflects several ways in which state law can reject federal law.
First, it shows that state law can reject federal law even when state law
directs harmonization between the two, and that rejection under those
circumstances can come even at the hands of state court judges.
Second, it shows how the different institutional concerns and constituencies can drive divergence between state and federal law. Finally, it
highlights well how difficult the abstract concept of uniformity can be
to apply in practice: uniformity with other states’ laws arguably counted
in favor of allowing indirect-purchaser suits, while uniformity with
federal law would have required the opposite.
B. Constitutional Congruence, Doctrinal Divergence: Eminent Domain for
Economic Use
Just as states can reject federal statutory precedent by expanding
the regulatory sweep of their own state laws, so too can they reject
federal constitutional precedent by setting more restrictive limits on
their own governments than the federal Constitution does. That is the
lesson of states’ widespread rejection of the expanded doctrine of
economic use in the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of
New London. 87 That opinion decided a question of federal constitutional law that was directly applicable to states under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. But because it set
(or, depending on one’s view, lowered) a floor for individual property
rights against the states, state law was free to reject that rule by
guaranteeing greater protections for property owners against the
threat of eminent domain.
85
86
87

Id. at 112 (McGregor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 109 (majority opinion).
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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Kelo involved the seizure of private property by the town of New
London, Connecticut, for use as part of a downtown- and waterfrontrevitalization project. 88 The question was whether the town’s
economic-use rationale qualified as a “public use” under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 89 The property holders who challenged the taking argued that economic development can never
qualify as a public use, because economic development benefits not
the public but the developers.
By a narrow 5–4 majority, the Supreme Court upheld the taking
and affirmed that economic development can constitute public use. It
emphasized the many circumstances in which past cases had located
public use, many of which were indistinguishable in principle from
economic development because they, too, blended public and private
benefits. 90 The Court also relied on the idea that it should defer to,
rather than second-guess, the government’s proffered rationales and
beliefs about the need for eminent domain to achieve its goals. 91
In conclusion, the majority recognized the role that state law
might play in limiting the sweep of its holding.
We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
power.
Indeed, many States already impose “public use”
requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of
these requirements have been established as a matter of state
constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent
domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings
may be exercised. 92

This recognition would prove prescient.
The reaction to Kelo was surprisingly negative. 93 In the wake of
Kelo, around forty states enacted legislation to limit state eminent
domain authority, while courts in several other states have limited the

88 Id. at 472.
89 See id. at 475–77; U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is made applicable
to the states by means of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R.
Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
90 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484–86.
91 Id. at 487–89.
92 Id. at 489 (footnote omitted).
93 See Dale A. Whitman, Eminent Domain Reform in Missouri: A Legislative Memoir, 71
MO. L. REV. 721, 726 (2006) (“[T]he outcome in Kelo struck many experienced observers
as a minor change in the law, expanding only slightly the power of local governments under
the ‘public use’ clause. The surprise was the reaction of the media and pundits, who
generally tended to treat the case as a horrible example of a Supreme Court run amok.”).
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eminent domain power through judicial interpretation. 94 So many
states amended their constitutions or passed statutes rejecting the rule
that one commentator has noted that “Kelo has ultimately had the
ironic effect of reducing takings authority.” 95
The Kelo example adds other dimensions of state law rejecting
federal law through: (1) constitutional as well as statutory means; and
(2) ballot initiatives and referenda as well as ordinary legislation and
judicial interpretation. And as with the antitrust examples considered
in Section II.A, the pattern of state law rejection of Kelo played out in
both legislatures and courts.
1. Missouri
Missouri’s reaction to Kelo shows how the existence of multiple
pathways of state lawmaking can influence how states reject federal law.
Missouri’s constitution, like that of many states, authorizes a process of
citizen initiative petitions for enacting statutes or amending the state
constitution. 96 In Kelo’s wake, law reform efforts proceeded along dual
tracks: one in the state legislature, the other by an initiative petition
that sought to amend the Constitution.
First, just five days after Kelo, then-Governor Matt Blunt created a
task force aimed at reforming Missouri’s eminent domain laws. 97 He
cited Kelo in the first sentence of his executive order. 98 The task
force—which comprised attorneys, business owners, lobbyists, and
lawmakers—issued its recommendations after a series of public

94 See Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal Legislative
and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 707 (2011); see also Ilya Somin,
The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2102
(2009).
95 Gregory J. Robson, Kelo v. City of New London: Its Ironic Impact on Takings Authority,
44 URB. LAW. 865, 883 (2012); see also Amanda W. Goodin, Note, Rejecting the Return to Blight
in Post-Kelo State Legislation, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 193 (2007) (noting that Kelo “served as a
catalyst for eminent domain reform at the state level”).
Of course, the federal government remains unconstrained by changes in state law.
In the area of takings, this means that the federal government can take property for
economic use. But in practice, it rarely does so. And under the Tucker Act, takings claims
against the federal government can only be brought in the Court of Federal Claims absent
legislative authorization to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491; Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr,
309 U.S. 242 (1940) (recognizing validity of Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity
and authorization of federal agency to be sued directly in federal district court).
96 See MO. CONST. art. III §§ 49–51.
97 Mo. Exec. Order No. 05-15 (June 28, 2003), https://www.sos.mo.gov/library
/reference/orders/2005/eo05_015 [https://perma.cc/3AYA-VUZ4].
98 Id.
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meetings. 99 The chair of the task force opened the first meeting with
remarks discussing Kelo, and then the task force received a briefing
about the case from the chair of the Missouri Bar’s Eminent Domain
Law Committee. 100 At a subsequent meeting, the task force heard
testimony from University of Missouri School of Law Professor Dale
Whitman about the law of eminent domain in general and Kelo in
particular. 101 In all, the task force’s minutes record dozens of references to Kelo by more than ten witnesses. 102
Even as the task force was proceeding, courts in Missouri were
wrestling with how to apply Kelo’s holding to local disputes. In
deciding an eminent domain dispute in favor of the government less
than a month after Kelo, a Missouri trial judge noted that:
The United States Supreme Court has denied the Alamo
reinforcements. . . . This muscular and sweeping federal
interpretation of eminent domain exists in harmony with the
similarly muscular and sweeping Missouri Supreme Court
interpretation of eminent domain. . . . The rhetoric . . . about states
putting narrower boundaries on eminent domain awaits an
uncertain future in Missouri. Perhaps the people will clip the wings
of eminent domain in Missouri, but today in Missouri it soars and
devours. 103

99 MO. TASK FORCE ON EMINENT DOMAIN, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
MISSOURI EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE (2005), https://www.eminentdomain.mo.gov
/documents/finalrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9PA-KXRL]; see Whitman, supra note 93, at
728 & nn.38–40.
100 MO. TASK FORCE ON EMINENT DOMAIN, EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE MEETING
MINUTES (Aug. 4, 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/20080820213355/http://www.mo.gov
/mo/eminentdomain/minutes/EDTFMeetingMinutes080405.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/8SW2-LLYY].
101 MO. TASK FORCE ON EMINENT DOMAIN, EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE MEETING
(Sept. 29, 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/20080820213554/http://www.mo.gov/mo
/eminentdomain/minutes/EDTFMeetingMinutes092905.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y6726ZJ2].
102 See id.; see also MO. TASK FORCE ON EMINENT DOMAIN, EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE
MEETING (Sept. 29, 2005), http://web.archive.org/web/20060930204437/http://www.mo
.gov/mo/eminentdomain/minutes/transcript081805.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LZ2-Z7XW].
One witness even noted that he had spoken to Ms. Kelo, the plaintiff in the Supreme Court
case, and that she had volunteered to come to Missouri and speak to the task force. Id. at
65. There is no evidence Ms. Kelo ever came to Missouri or communicated with the task
force.
103 City of St. Louis v. Leggett, No. 22052-01130 (Mo. Cir. Ct., July 18, 2005); see also
Tim O’Neil, Woman, Son in Path of Development Fight On, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 2,
2005, at C1.
THE
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Texas Senator John Cornyn later quoted this passage in remarks in the
U.S. Senate decrying Kelo’s holding. 104
Against this backdrop, the task force recommended, among other
reforms, defining “public use” to exclude “the public benefits of
economic development,” a direct repudiation of the holding in Kelo. 105
Legislative sponsors bundled a rejection of Kelo with several of the task
force’s other recommendations in a bill that attracted seventy cosponsors in the Missouri House. 106 The bill passed both houses of the
Missouri legislature by a combined vote of 176–4. 107 At the signing
ceremony for the new law, Governor Blunt noted that he had been
“concerned when the Supreme Court said that anytime you can create
more revenue for the government, you can seize somebody’s land.” 108
Unlike the success of the legislative reform effort, a separate
proposed constitutional amendment never even made it on the ballot.
The proposed amendment would have restricted eminent domain
more sharply than the legislative reform did, including by banning the
use of eminent domain for any private purpose, with certain exceptions for utilities, and by giving property owners a right to repurchase
their property if not used by the government. 109 Indeed, one member
of the Governor’s task force dismissed the petition as “extreme” and
“unnecessary in light of the Legislature’s action.” 110 That the initiative
petition went further than the legislative reform matches a systematic
104 152 Cong. Rec., S6,449 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn), https://www.govinfo.gov
/content/pkg/CREC-2006-06-23/html/CREC-2006-06-23-pt1-PgS6449.htm [https://perma
.cc/X4Z4-UNW2].
105 MO. TASK FORCE ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 99, at 7.
106 See H.B. 1944, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006) (as read first time
March 2, 2006), https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills061/hlrbillspdf/4100L.04I.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B565-BFEE].
107 The initial vote in the House was 154–4, and after minor amendments, the bill
passed in the Senate 31–1. MO. J. HOUSE, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., 1058–59 (April
13, 2006) (H.B. 93-1944); MO. J. SEN., 93rd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., 987 (May 3, 2006)
(H.B. 93-1944). The conference bill was similarly popular, passing 144–3 and 32–1 in the
House and Senate, respectively. MO. J. HOUSE, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., 1563–64
(May 5, 2006) (H.B. 93-1944); MO. J. SEN., 93rd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., 1073 (May 5,
2006) (H.B. 93-1944).
108 Mike Dwyer, Governor Enacts Eminent-Domain Reform Law, JOPLIN GLOBE (July 14,
2006), https://www.joplinglobe.com/news/local_news/governor-enacts-eminent-domainreform-law/article_eed7ca7c-5745-50e0-8844-e7d42f82e385.html [https://perma.cc/7Q2WG63X].
109 See 2006 Initiative Petitions Approved for Circulation in Missouri, MO. SEC’Y OF STATE,
https://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2006petitions/ipEminentDomainI-34 [https://perma.cc
/9Z6G-GEH5].
110 Jim Davis, Carnahan Rejects Petitions on Eminent Domain, K.C. BUS. J. (May 26, 2006),
https://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2006/05/22/daily30.html [https://perma
.cc/VZ52-UG2T].
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study of states’ responses to Kelo, which found that post-Kelo citizen
initiatives led to greater restrictions on the eminent domain power
than did either purely legislative reforms or legislative referenda. 111
Although the group sponsoring the proposed amendment raised
over $2 million to secure the requisite number of signatures—nearly
all of which came from groups in New York and Idaho 112—its efforts
did not succeed. On the same day that the legislature sent its reform
bill to Governor Blunt for his signature, the Secretary of State rejected
the initiative petition for failing to garner the requisite number of
verifiable signatures. 113
Missouri’s experience with eminent domain reform teaches two
lessons. First, state lawmakers can react to federal caselaw swiftly, near
unanimously, and largely independently of national political forces.
Second, even if state rejection of federal law reads as motivated by outof-state interests, it may face political headwinds because of perceived
illegitimacy.
2. Florida
Florida was one of the first states to respond to Kelo. Unlike
Missouri, Florida used both statutory and constitutional mechanisms
to erect new limits on the state’s eminent domain power. For that
reason, eminent domain critics consider Florida one of the best
examples of post-Kelo reform.
The day after the decision in Kelo came down, the Speaker of the
Florida House of Representatives announced the creation of a Select
Committee to Protect Private Property Rights chaired by thenRepresentative Marco Rubio. 114 The committee’s purpose was “to
identify areas of ambiguity and recommend changes to ensure
111 See Somin, supra note 94, at 2105, 2143, 2148 (“The contrast is not so much between
legislative reform and referendum initiatives, but between referenda enacted without the
need for approval by the state legislature and every other type of reform that does involve
state legislators.”).
112 See MISSOURIANS IN CHARGE COMMITTEE SUMMARY, MISSOURI ETHICS COMMISSION,
https://mec.mo.gov/MEC/Campaign_Finance/CommInfo.aspx?mecid=C061044 [https://
perma.cc/R9VK-F3RY]; see also Steve Scott, Don’t Let Outsiders Call Shots in Missouri, COLUM.
DAILY TRIB., Dec. 3, 2006.
113 See MO. HOUSE J., 93rd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., 1975 (May 26, 2006) (H.B. 931944); Press Release, Mo. Sec. of State, Two Initiative Petitions Deemed Insufficient for
November Ballot (May 26, 2006), https://www.sos.mo.gov/default.aspx?PageID=5160
[https://perma.cc/VRW4-SXX4].
114 FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STAFF ANALYSIS, HB 1567 CS, at 2 (Mar. 28, 2006),
https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h1567b
.JC.doc&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=1567&Session=2006
[https://perma.cc
/5ZR2-HM6S].
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appropriate protections of property rights.” 115 The eventual statute
passed both houses of the Florida legislature by a combined margin of
150–3. 116 Eminent domain critics have praised the law as a strong
bulwark against eminent domain abuse. 117
But Florida legislators went further. Again led by Representative
Rubio, the legislature proposed an amendment to the state constitution that sought even stronger limits on government’s eminent domain
power. 118 That proposed amendment required a supermajority vote in
the legislature before any property acquired by the state under its
eminent domain power could go to a private party. The referendum
passed with 69% of the vote, easily clearing the 60% threshold needed
for passage. 119
Florida’s example thus underscores that state rejection of federal
caselaw can be popular with many constituencies, and state lawmakers
can reject federal law by either statutory or constitutional law.
C. Textual Divergence, Doctrinal Convergence: Injury-in-Fact
The examples considered thus far have showed how state law
often rejects federal caselaw despite textual similarity. Yet states can
also accept or reject federal caselaw despite textual divergence.
Indeed, there are other examples of this phenomenon in the
literature. For example, Scott Dodson has illustrated how state rules
of civil procedure are often interpreted in harmony with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, despite very different text. 120 Those examples
of state law being caught in federal law’s sway are an important part of
the phenomenon described here.
What this Part adds is the observation that state law’s seemingly
voluntary and uncompelled adherence to federal precedent is often
but a prelude to a dramatic and contentious fight over whether to
reject federal doctrine. When a state decides to adopt federal caselaw
and doctrine into state law, it effectively creates the same conditions

115 Id.
116 HB 1567 (2006) – Eminent Domain, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://www
.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=33829 [https://perma.cc/6DJ8QHRL].
117 See, e.g., Somin, supra note 94, at 2139 (“[T]he new Florida law is probably the most
important post-Kelo legislative victory for property rights activists.”).
118 H.J.R. 1569 (2006) – Eminent Domain, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://www
.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=33830.
119 FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e); Div. of Elections, Fla. Dep’t of State, November 7, 2006
General Election: Official Results, ELECTION REPORTING SYS., https://results.elections
.myflorida.com/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/7/2006&DATAMODE=
[https://perma.cc
/CB5H-HVZL].
120 See Dodson, supra note 38, at 718.
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that made state rejection of federal law surprising in the cases of
antitrust and takings. Once state and federal law fall in lockstep, any
departure from federal doctrine proves conspicuous and potentially
destabilizing. That is so because it not only marks an identifiable
departure of state law from federal law but also signals a potential
willingness by state actors to depart from federal law in a broader set
of future cases, which may be difficult to identify in advance.
These examples also reveal how a state’s acceptance or rejection
of federal precedent is not necessarily the last word. So long as the
dynamics causing the initial choice remain, the battle can rage again
in the future. Even after a years-long battle over whether to accept or
reject federal doctrine, state decisionmakers often lack the institutional and doctrinal tools to reach a durable compromise that could
create stable doctrine. In these cases, then, we see especially the
potentially destabilizing influence that federal law has on state law.
The cases in this Part focus on standing to sue. Under federal law,
this is a constitutional and subject-matter-jurisdictional requirement
derived from the case-or-controversy language of Article III. In Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 121 the Supreme Court offered its clearest and
sharpest formulation of standing doctrine to date. The case concerned
the standing of plaintiffs who sued under the Endangered Species Act,
which contained a “citizen suit” provision authorizing “any person” to
enforce its terms. Despite this legislative grant of a statutory cause of
action, the question in Lujan was whether plaintiffs had suffered an
“injury-in-fact” to satisfy Article III’s requirement of a case or
controversy. 122
In a 5–4 opinion, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to sue. 123 Lujan thus stands in part for the proposition that Congress
cannot create standing by conferring a cause of action, but that Article
III requires some personal, particularized connection between the
plaintiff and the harm alleged. 124 Because this conclusion marked a
break from earlier Supreme Court precedent, and because many states
looked to federal precedent in crafting their own standing doctrines, 125
Lujan forced states to grapple with whether to follow or reject its
doctrinal restatement.
To prove the point, this Part traces judicial battles over standing
doctrine in Texas, Michigan, and Oregon. Before Lujan, Texas followed its own idiosyncratic precedent on standing doctrine. But in the
121 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
122 Id. at 560, 571–73.
123 Id. at 556–57.
124 Id. at 560.
125 State courts are not bound by standing requirements derived from Article III. See
ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).
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wake of Lujan, the Texas Supreme Court strained to find a basis in
Texas law to adopt the doctrine announced by Lujan. Like Texas,
Michigan and Oregon were at first persuaded to adopt federal
standing doctrine. After doing so, however, future courts in those
states reversed course and developed a new set of standing rules in
explicit rejection of the federal model. Taken together, then, these
examples suggest answers to four questions. First, how do state courts
come to consider federal precedent when deciding cases under state
law? Second, how do state courts reconcile federal caselaw with their
own constitutional text and history? Third, what kinds of jurisdictional
gaps can states’ departure from federal rules create? And finally, why
is state law adopted in the wake of federal law unstable over time and
therefore prone to overruling?
These examples also show the limits of formal legal principles in
explaining state courts’ decisions about whether to borrow federal law.
State judicial elections and retirements—which in some cases are
compelled at a certain age—inject another layer of unpredictability
into the process. In short, these cases highlight how institutional
dynamics, politics, and ideology play important roles in federal law’s
influence on state law.
1. Texas
The cases analyzed so far have tended to show how state actors
find room to reject federal law despite textual similarity between
analogous legal provisions. Texas’s standing decisions show the
converse: how a textual hook for borrowing federal standing doctrine
can be found even when the text of the relevant federal and state
constitutional provisions are different. In particular, the Texas
Supreme Court took a sharp turn toward following federal standing
doctrine in 1993, when it retconned 126 federal standing doctrine into
Texas law by marrying it to an unlikely pair of state constitutional
provisions that bear little resemblance to Article III’s case-orcontroversy provision. Texas thus represents the purest form of federal doctrine being inscribed identically into state law under the guise
of sharply divergent constitutional text.

126 Words We’re Watching: A Short History of ‘Retcon,’ MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/retcon-history-and-meaning
[https://perma.cc
/W6DF-R3Y4 ] (“Retcon is a shortened form of retroactive continuity, and refers to a literary
device in which the form or content of a previously established narrative is changed.”);
Retcon, WIKTIONARY (last updated Oct. 15, 2019) (“A situation, in a soap opera or similar
serial fiction, in which a new storyline explains or changes a previous event or attaches a
new significance to it.”).
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Before 1993, Texas standing doctrine was prudential, flexible, and
liberal. We know that it was prudential because earlier cases held that
standing was waivable. In a 1982 case, the Texas Supreme Court held
that “[a] party’s lack of justiciable interest must be pointed out to the
trial court . . . and a ruling thereon must be obtained or the matter is
waived.” 127 Indeed, the case even held that the lower court’s sua sponte
consideration of the standing issue constituted legal error. 128 Nor was
that a stray holding: in a 1966 case, the Texas Supreme Court held that
sua sponte dismissal for lack of standing was reversible because a waived
challenge to a party’s standing could not deprive a trial court of
subject-matter jurisdiction. 129 Earlier cases also demonstrated Texas
courts’ willingness to entertain suits under broad citizen-suit provisions
or under the guise of much more liberal taxpayer standing rules than
prevail in federal court. 130
Then, in 1993, the Texas Supreme Court recast its standing
doctrine to be both constitutional and subject-matter jurisdictional. In
Texas Ass’n of Business v. Texas Air Control Board, the state chamber of
commerce, on behalf of its members, sought a declaration that the
statutory basis for certain administrative penalties was invalid under
the Texas Constitution. 131 Although the court ultimately upheld
plaintiff’s standing to sue on behalf of its members, it did so only after
raising the issue sua sponte and requesting more briefing on the
question. 132 No party challenged the plaintiff’s standing to bring the
suit: the strange bedfellows in agreement on that score included not
only the chamber of commerce and two state regulatory agencies but
also intervenors the League of Women Voters and the Sierra Club. 133
127 Tex. Indus. Traffic League v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 633 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.
1982) (per curiam).
128 See id. at 822–23.
129 See Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 403 S.W.2d 340, 347–48 (Tex. 1966) (“The
intervenors were permitted to come into the case without opposition and to assume the
status of the fighting defendants. The place to have challenged their interest and their
right to intervene was in the trial court.”).
130 See Scott v. Bd. of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex. 1966) (“Inasmuch as they
are suing as taxpayers, it was not necessary for them to prove particular damage which would
be required if they were suing as ‘persons aggrieved.’”); Spence v. Fenchler, 180 S.W. 597,
602, 608 (Tex. 1915) (holding to be justiciable a citizen suit pursuant to Texas statute that
authorized “any citizen” to sue to enjoin “[t]he habitual, actual, threatened or
contemplated use of any premises, place, building or part thereof, for the purpose of
keeping . . . a bawdy or disorderly house”).
131 852 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. 1993).
132 Id. at 443–48.
133 See id. at 467 (Doggett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The issue of
standing is a stranger to this litigation. No party before this court has ever asserted that the
Texas Association of Business lacked capacity to challenge the actions of state government.
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Moreover, and in any event, all parties agreed that the defendants had
waived the issue in the trial court below. 134
Even so, in an opinion written by then-Justice (and now-U.S.
Senator) John Cornyn, the Texas Supreme Court found it necessary to
reach the question of standing on its own. Despite the precedent,
discussed above, that standing was waivable in Texas courts, the
majority concluded that standing was subject-matter jurisdictional—a
holding it attributed to two separate provisions of the Texas
Constitution when read together with federal standing doctrine.
First, the court traced standing doctrine to the Texas
Constitution’s separation of powers provision and federal caselaw
affirming the importance of standing to separation of powers in the
federal system. 135 The majority reasoned that because the separationof-powers provision bars “advisory opinions,” 136 and because opinions
that issue in disputes when the plaintiff lacks standing are perhaps
advisory, 137 the separation-of-powers provision provides a constitutional hook for standing doctrine as well.
Second, and more ironically, the court read Texas’s constitutional
open-courts provision to impose a constitutional requirement that a
plaintiff show injury to have standing to sue in Texas courts. That
provision, which Texas’s Constitution shares in substance with those of
thirty-nine other states, 138 provides that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and
How rare the occasion when all litigants agree on the proper resolution of an issue, but how
truly extraordinary is such unanimity when the parties are two state regulatory agencies, the
Texas Association of Business, the Sierra Club and the League of Women Voters.”).
134 See id. at 443 (majority opinion) (“In response, the parties insist that any question
of standing has been waived in the trial court and cannot be raised by the court for the first
time on appeal.”).
135 See id. at 444. The majority’s citations for this proposition were Article II, § 1 of the
Texas Constitution of 1876. TEX. CONST. of 1876 art. II, § 1 (“The powers of the
government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of
which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative
to one; those which are executive to another, and those which are judicial to another; and
no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any
power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly
permitted.”). As well as Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471–74 (1982), Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), and
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 18
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 889 n.69 (1983).
136 See Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (first citing Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Burch,
442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1969); and then citing Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641, 644
(Tex. 1933)).
137 For this proposition, the court cited federal rather than Texas precedent. See id.
(citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
138 See CHARLES W. “ROCKY” RHODES, THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION IN STATE AND NATION
114 (2014) (noting that Texas is one of forty with similar open-courts provisions in their
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every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” 139 Such provisions—which trace their lineage to the Magna Carta through Sir
Edward Coke 140—typically operate to expand access to state courts,
either by guaranteeing the existence of at least one court able to
redress a plaintiff’s grievances or by barring unreasonable financial
barriers to suit. 141 Yet the majority in Texas Ass’n of Business read the
open-courts provision as a restriction on the subject-matter jurisdiction
of Texas courts only to disputes brought by plaintiffs who have suffered
an “injury.” As the majority explained, “standing is implicit in the open
courts provision, which contemplates access to the courts only for
those litigants suffering an injury.” 142
After identifying two ostensible bases in state constitutional text
for standing doctrine, the majority switched back to relying on federal
precedent. “Because standing is a constitutional prerequisite to
maintaining a suit under both federal and Texas law, we look to the
more extensive jurisprudential experience of the federal courts on this
subject for any guidance it may yield.” 143 Ultimately, the court held
that the chamber of commerce had standing to sue under federal
associational standing principles and therefore proceeded to the
merits. 144 In so holding, the court noted explicitly that it overruled
one prior case that held standing to be waivable. 145
Then-Justice (now-U.S. Representative) Doggett dissented under
the following epigraph:

state constitutions); Thomas R. Phillips, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Texas, The
Constitutional Right to a Remedy, Address at William J. Brennan Lecture on State Courts
and Social Justice (Feb. 28, 2002), in 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1310 & n.6 (2003).
139 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
140 RHODES, supra note 138, at 364; Phillips, supra note 138, at 1320 (tracing historical
pedigree).
141 See, e.g., Runge & Co. v. Wyatt, 25 Tex. Supp. 291, 294 (1860); Dillingham v.
Putnam, 14 S.W. 303, 304 (Tex. 1890).
142 Texas Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444.
143 Id.
144 See id. at 448. On the merits, the majority relied again on the open-courts provision,
this time for the proposition that an agency’s imposition of forfeiture penalties before a
defendant can seek judicial review violates the right of court access. See id. at 450 (“We
conclude that the forfeiture provision is an unreasonable restriction on access to the
courts.”).
145 See id. at 446 (“The analysis that leads us to the conclusion we reach here, however,
compels us to overrule Texas Industrial Traffic League and disapprove of all cases relying on
it to the extent that they conflict with this opinion.”).
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“Don’t Mess With Texas”
—A motto that captures the Texas spirit. 146

Suffused throughout the dissent is the view that both the text of
the Texas Constitution and the precedent interpreting it differed
significantly from their federal analogs, and that the majority opinion
adopted federal law at the expense of state precedent. On the standing
issue, Justice Doggett noted that, to reach the issue of standing at all,
“the majority [had to] overcome what, until recently, was viewed as a
considerable obstacle—Texas law.” 147 The dissent characterized the
majority’s approach to the Texas precedent deeming standing to be
waivable as “simple”: “overrule only one case, making it today’s abrupt
change in the law appear less drastic, while ignoring the rest,” which it
counted as another five cases from the Texas Supreme Court. 148 The
dissent also challenged the majority’s decision to “write[] into our
Texas law books the confused and troubling federal standing
limitations.” 149 The weight of the dissent’s objection to the majority’s
approach was that it represented “another unthinking embrace of
federal law,” “[r]ather than a careful consideration of our Texas
precedent and our unique Texas Constitution.” 150
Texas Ass’n of Business planted federal standing doctrine in the
foreign soil of Texas constitutional text, where it has now taken root.
The case’s holding endures: Texas standing doctrine is subject-matter
jurisdictional and traceable to the separation-of-powers and opencourts provisions of the Texas constitution. 151 Indeed, Texas courts
have cited the case over 2500 times in twenty-seven years. And Texas
courts continue to cite and rely on federal standing cases in reaching
results under state law. 152

146 Id. at 452 (Doggett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147 Id. at 468.
148 Id. at 469.
149 Id. at 473.
150 Id. at 475.
151 See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex.
2004); Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. 2001); M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v.
Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. 2001); see also RHODES, supra note 138, at 113 (“The
supreme court and the courts of appeals have repeatedly reaffirmed since Texas Ass’n of
Business that Texas standing doctrine is premised on both these provisions.”).
152 See, e.g., Brown, 53 S.W.3d at 305 (Tex. 2001) (“[W]e may look to the similar federal
standing requirements for guidance.”); Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. City of Dripping
Springs, 304 S.W.3d 871, 878, 880–82 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (relying on federal precedent).
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2. Michigan
If Texas shows how an ideologically salient issue like standing can
cause state actors to strain to adopt federal law despite an apparent
lack of any textual basis for doing so, Michigan shows how that process
can go awry. Like Texas, Michigan at first adopted Lujan as a matter
of state law without an obvious constitutional basis for doing so. But
not long after it did so, a newly constituted Michigan Supreme Court
revisited the issue and reversed course. The cleavages wrought by this
whipsawing reversal remain to this day, and they have supported
insinuations of bad constitutional history, naked partisanship, and bad
faith.
The story begins with the 1995 case Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City
of Detroit. 153 Detroit’s firefighters’ union 154 sued the city for failing to
spend certain appropriated funds intended to expand the fire
department. 155 The threshold question was whether the firefighters
had a particularized interest in their claims, or whether their interest
was identical to that of other Detroit taxpayers. The intermediate
court had reversed the trial court on standing, ruling 2–1 156 that the
firefighters’ claimed “risk” of “physical and emotional injury” could
not confer standing. 157 There was no mention of Lujan.
On appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, the plaintiff
firefighters pressed the same argument, and the result was again a split
decision rendered by a deeply divided court. 158 There were four
separate opinions representing the views of seven justices. No opinion
garnered a majority on the question of standing (or, for that matter,
any of the merits issues). Yet despite their inability to agree on a
rationale, a bare 4–3 majority held that the firefighters had standing to
sue. Of the four separate opinions, two found standing and two would
have held that standing was lacking. The opinions varied markedly in
their degree of reliance on federal standing caselaw.
Three justices concluded that the firefighters lacked standing.
The lead opinion for Justice Weaver alone concluded that plaintiffs
lacked standing and relied exclusively on Michigan caselaw, which she
153 537 N.W.2d 436 (Mich. 1995).
154 Along with some of its individual members.
155 See id. at 437.
156 The majority opinion was written by then-Presiding Judge Taylor, while the dissent
was written by then-Judge Kelly. Both judges would later be elected to the Michigan
Supreme Court. Their disagreement about standing would extend to their tenure together
on the high court, as we will see. See infra nn.158–64 and accompanying notes.
157 Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 501 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993).
158 Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n, 537 N.W.2d at 437.
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read to require particularization. 159 The opinion of Justice Riley
concurring, joined by Justice Brickley, also would have held that the
firefighters lack standing, even if on different grounds. 160 In
particular, besides reasoning that Michigan’s prudential (rather than
constitutional) standing rules require particularization, Justice Riley
relied on federal prudential—i.e., statutory—standing doctrine requiring a plaintiff to show that she falls within the “zone of interest” the
statute covers. 161 Relying on, among other cases, Data Processing,
Justices Riley and Brickley thus would have ruled against the plaintiffs
on standing. 162 Perhaps surprisingly, none of the justices arguing for
a lack of standing relied on or even cited Lujan.
Four justices concluded that the requirement of standing was
satisfied. Like their dissenting colleagues, however, they diverged in
their degree of reliance on federal rather than state cases. Chief Justice
Cavanagh 163 (joined by Justice Boyle) would have found standing
because the plaintiffs had satisfied the tripartite doctrinal test from
Lujan, which the opinion block-quoted in full. 164 Finally, Justice
Mallett (joined by Justice Levin) would have found standing based
almost exclusively on Michigan caselaw. 165
Counting noses reveals that there was disagreement on two axes:
whether the plaintiffs had standing and whether federal cases were
relevant to the standing issue. On that latter issue, the split was also 4–
3, with the majority concluding that such federal precedent was indeed
relevant (and perhaps dispositive). But even among that majority,
there was disagreement about whether to incorporate the earlier rule
159 Id. at 438 (lead opinion).
160 Id. at 441 (Riley, J., concurring).
161 Id. at 443–44.
162 Id. Further illustrating the prudential nature of standing under Michigan law,
however, all three of the justices in the minority on the question of standing agreed it was
prudent to proceed to the merits in virtue of the importance and potentially recurrent
nature of plaintiffs’ claims.
163 Interestingly, Chief Justice Cavanagh’s older brother, Jerome, was mayor of Detroit
for eight years in the 1960s. See Kevin Grasha, Justice Cavanagh Ending Long Tenure on State
High Court, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 26, 2014, https://www.freep.com/story/news/local
/michigan/2014/12/26/justice-cavanagh-ending-long-tenure-state-high-court/20909493
/. [https://perma.cc/G2S5-43KU]. Chief Justice Cavanagh therefore had a unique
perspective on the issues raised in the suit.
164 Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n, 537 N.W.2d at 445–46 (Cavanaugh, C.J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992)).
165 Id. at 450–52 (Mallett, J., concurring in the result only). This opinion contains one
citation to Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968), for the proposition that “[i]t is necessary
and appropriate to examine the substantive issue and determine whether there is a logical
nexus between the plaintiffs’ status and the substantive claim.” Id. at 450.
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of Data Processing and its progeny or whether to follow the new
doctrinal test crystallized in Lujan. Michigan courts had neither
recognized nor rejected any of the federal tests as controlling. The
fractured court in Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n thus guaranteed further
litigation about not only standing under Michigan law but also the
relationship between federal precedent and Michigan law.
It would be another six years before the next major case
addressing standing under Michigan law, but the intervening years did
nothing to resolve the disagreements made plain in Detroit Fire Fighters
Ass’n. Like that earlier case, the 2001 case Lee v. Macomb County Board
of Commissioners 166 led to a sharply divided 4–3 court and multiple
separate opinions (in this case, three). And in Lee as in Detroit Fire
Fighters Ass’n, the dispute concerned not only whether the plaintiffs
had standing but also whether to adopt federal doctrine in deciding
that question.
The plaintiffs in Lee sued to require their county governments to
levy a tax required by statute to fund veterans’ relief. 167 The standing
question in the case was whether the plaintiffs, who were eligible to
apply for payments from the veterans’ relief fund but had not done so,
had suffered a legally sufficient injury. 168 The defendants argued that
even if the county had assessed the tax, the plaintiffs would not have
been any better off, because they never applied for payments from the
fund. 169 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ failure to levy the
tax made it pointless to apply for payments from an empty fund. 170
Justice Taylor wrote the opinion for the four-justice majority,
which sought to incorporate the rule of Lujan fully into Michigan law
and to use that rule to limit standing. 171 The opinion’s analysis of the
standing issue presented general standing principles and federal
caselaw and then tried to show that Michigan caselaw was not
inconsistent with those alternate sources. In that vein, the standing
analysis began with the claim that “[i]t is important, initially, to
recognize that in Michigan, as in the federal system, standing is of great
consequence so that neglect of it would imperil the constitutional

166 629 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. 2001).
167 Id. at 902–03.
168 Id. at 904.
169 Id. at 904–05.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 908. Taylor was a member of the Court of Appeals panel that heard Detroit
Fire Fighters, and his was the majority opinion that was ultimately overruled by the Supreme
Court. Lee was thus Justice Taylor’s opportunity to vindicate his view, expressed in that
earlier opinion, that standing doctrine is as restrictive under Michigan law as it is under
federal law.
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architecture whereby governmental powers are divided between the
three branches of government.” 172 It then quoted from Article III and
several federal standing and separation-of-powers cases—some of
which related only tangentially to standing. 173 The opinion then
claimed that “In Michigan, standing has developed on a track parallel to
the federal doctrine, albeit by way of an additional constitutional
underpinning.” 174 In fusing these two sources of authority, the
opinion did not mention the Michigan constitution’s lack of any
analog to the federal constitution’s “case” or “controversy” language,
but emphasized the Michigan constitution’s general separation-ofpowers provision. 175 The majority also invoked Justice Cavanagh’s
separate opinion in Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n, which relied on Lujan,
and adopted it as the law of Michigan, “supplementing the holding in”
the court’s prior standing cases. 176 Applying Lujan, the majority held
that the plaintiffs’ injury was either not concrete or had not yet come
to pass. 177 The majority opinion thus at least superficially grappled
with the theoretical basis for standing doctrine, the reasoning of Lujan
and other federal standing cases, as well as the compatibility of Lujan
with Michigan precedent.
Justice Weaver, writing only for himself, concurred in the
judgment but disagreed with the decision both to inscribe Lujan into
state law and to deny that plaintiffs had standing. The concurrence
began by denying the majority’s assumed similarity between Michigan
and federal law of standing: “Unlike constitutional cases in federal
courts, the Michigan standing requirements have been based on
prudential, rather than constitutional, concerns.” 178 The opinion also
noted that federal standing rules do not bind Michigan courts. 179 On
that basis, the concurrence found it “unnecessary” to adopt Lujan and
concluded that plaintiffs had standing under existing Michigan law. 180

172 Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
173 See id. at 905–06. Among the cases quoted are Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349
(1996); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–25 (1995); and Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 820 (1997).
174 Lee, 629 N.W.2d at 906 (emphasis added).
175 See id. (citing MICH. CONST. art III, § 2). That provision reads: “The powers of
government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person
exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another
branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” MICH. CONST. art III, § 2.
176 Lee, 629 N.W.2d at 907.
177 See id. at 908.
178 Id. at 909 (Weaver, J., concurring).
179 Id. at 909 & n.2.
180 Id.
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Justice Kelly, joined by Justice Cavanagh, dissented on the
merits. 181 Although she would have affirmed, she urged Lujan’s adoption as a matter of Michigan law. 182 In explaining her disagreement,
Justice Kelly too relied on federal caselaw: Warth v. Seldin. 183 The
dissent also organized its analysis of the standing issue around Lujan’s
three steps: injury, causation, and redressability. 184
Across the three opinions, then, the justices disagreed 4–3 about
whether plaintiffs had standing. But there was much more agreement
that Lujan should be the law of Michigan: six justices endorsed that
view. That represented a marked increase from Detroit Fire Fighters
Ass’n, in which only two justices endorsed Lujan as the operative test
under Michigan law. 185 In the intervening years, because of a combination of factors—including changes in court composition and the
continued consolidation of federal standing doctrine—Michigan’s
judiciary had become much more receptive to adopting federal
standing doctrine. Lee thus shows that state-court receptivity to federal
doctrine largely hinges on facts other than state constitutional text and
pre-existing state law.
While Lee showed that state courts can become more receptive to
federal law over time, the next case in the sequence—Lansing Schools
Education Ass’n v. Lansing Board of Education 186—shows that state courts
can reject federal law just as fast as they adopted it. Lansing Schools
Education Ass’n is an example of liberal judges seeking to expand
standing under Michigan law. This feature of the case was evident even
before merits briefing. In its order granting leave to appeal, the
Michigan Supreme Court not only accepted the appeal but also
directed the parties, sua sponte, to brief (1) whether the plaintiffs had
standing; and (2) whether it should overrule Lee. 187 That order was
controversial enough that Justice Young dissented from that part of it

181 Like Justice Taylor, Justice Kelly was a member of the Court of Appeals panel in
Detroit Fire Fighters Association and had since been elected to the Supreme Court. However,
then-Judge Kelly’s opinion in that earlier case was in dissent. Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v.
City of Detroit 501 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (Kelly, J., dissenting).
182 See Lee, 629 N.W.2d at 912–13 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (“While I agree with the
majority’s adoption of the Lujan test, I cannot agree that plaintiffs lack standing.”).
183 Id. at 913 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975)).
184 See id. at 913–14.
185 Only one, Justice Cavanagh, endorsed Lujan in both Detroit Fire Fighters Association
and Lee.
186 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2010).
187 Lansing Schs. Educ. Ass’n, MEA/NEA v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 774 N.W.2d 689, 689
(Mich. 2009).
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directing briefing on the vitality of Lee. 188 Justice Young described the
order as “yet another installment in Chief Justice Kelly’s promise to
‘undo a great deal of damage that the Republican Court has done.’” 189
Justice Young also noted the broad, six-justice agreement to adopt
Lujan in Lee and the later change-of-heart by Justices Kelly and
Cavanagh. 190 Whether to retain the rule of Lujan was an ideologically
charged and politically salient issue to the justices of the Michigan
Supreme Court.
By the time the Michigan Supreme Court decided Lansing Schools
Education Ass’n, its outcome was unsurprising: a narrow 4–3 majority
held that Lujan was no longer the test for standing in Michigan. 191
Justice Cavanagh—a supporter of the Lujan test in Lee—wrote the
opinion for the court. In a sweeping opinion that canvassed the
“consistency of the historical development of the standing doctrine in
Michigan” before Lee and the fundamental differences between the
federal and Michigan constitutions, the court announced that
“Michigan standing jurisprudence should be restored to a limited,
prudential doctrine that is consistent with Michigan’s long-standing
approach to standing.” 192
The separate opinions took direct aim at the merits of Lujan.
Justice Weaver concurred and wrote separately to elaborate his reasons
for rejecting the Lujan test. 193 The majority also spurred a blistering
dissent. The dissent accused the court of “rewrit[ing] the entire constitutionally based legal doctrine governing standing in Michigan” by
“jettison[ing] years of binding precedent on the basis of four justices’
current estimation that the public would be better served by opening
the courts to all manner of challenges to acts of the legislative and
executive branches.” 194

188 Lansing Schs. Educ. Ass’n, MEA/NEA v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 780 N.W.2d 751
(Mich. 2009) (Young, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 751 (quoting Brian Dickerson, Justices Gird for Gang of 3 ½, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Jan. 11, 2009, at 1B).
190 See id; see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Cleve. Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 839
(Cavanagh, J., concurring) (“Lujan should not be used to determine standing in this
state.”); id. at 847 (Kelly, J., concurring) (“It is improper to hold the plaintiffs in this case
to the Lujan judicial test for standing.”).
191 Lansing Schs. Educ. Ass’n.,792 N.W.2d at 688 (“Therefore, we overrule Lee and its
progeny and hold that Michigan standing jurisprudence should be restored to a limited,
prudential approach that is consistent with Michigan’s long-standing historical approach to
standing.”).
192 Id. at 692–93, 699.
193 See id. at 702–03 (Weaver, J., concurring).
194 Id. at 708 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
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Even if one is unpersuaded by the dissent, it makes a larger point
about the effects of federal caselaw on state law. Not only is a state’s
adopting federal law contingently based on such factors as judicial
elections and retirements, 195 but also a state court adopting federal
doctrine into state law lacks the power to make the incorporation stick,
given the possibility of subsequent overruling. Thus, particularly in
view of the rancor of the court’s opinions and the later change in
partisan composition of the court, Lansing Schools Education Ass’n is
unlikely to be the last word on the matter. 196
3. Oregon
Oregon’s experience adds another complexity to the lessons
taught by Michigan: the role of intermediate appellate courts. In most
cases, the first state actors to respond to new federal caselaw will be
intermediate state appellate courts, not state supreme courts. That first
opinion deciding whether to accept or reject federal law may give an
impression of settled law that belies the way federal law renders state
law especially contestable.
We join the development of Oregon standing doctrine already in
progress with the case of Utsey v. Coos County, 197 decided by the
intermediate Court of Appeals in 2001—nine years after Lujan. The
facts of the case involved an attempt by two Coos County residents to
obtain permission to use their land, zoned for farming, as a motocross
racetrack. 198 Oregon law required racetrack permits from a state
administrative agency, which was granted. The local League of
Women Voters organization, which had opposed the rezoning before
the administrative agency, petitioned for review of the decision as a
purported intervenor in the case under an Oregon statute authorizing
any party to a land-use proceeding to seek judicial review. 199 The

195 Michigan law requires Supreme Court Justices to retire at age 70. MICH CONST. art.
VI, § 19.
196 See Kenneth Charette, Note, Standing Alone?: The Michigan Supreme Court, the
Lansing Decision, and the Liberalization of Standing Doctrine, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 199, 221
(2011) (“Only time will tell if this new majority will seek to overturn the litigation[-]friendly
test for standing that the Michigan Supreme Court created when it decided Lansing.”).
197 32 P.3d 933 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (en banc).
198 Id. at 935.
199 See id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 197.850(1) (“Any party to a proceeding before the
Land Use Board of Appeals under ORS 197.830 to 197.845 may seek judicial review of a
final order issued in those proceedings.”). The statute provided for review by petition
directly to the Court of Appeals. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.850(3)(a).
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landowners moved to dismiss the petition as “nonjusticiable” because
the outcome of the dispute would not affect the League. 200
The Court of Appeals framed the question as “whether a
legislative conferral of standing is sufficient to establish the
justiciability of a claim” or, “said another way, . . . whether the
constitution imposes limits on the authority of the legislature to confer
a right to seek judicial review.” 201 So framed, the question presented
in Utsey was very similar to that in Lujan: can the legislature create a
provision that allows any citizen to challenge the legality of an
administrative action? 202
As it was in Michigan, whether Lujan applied as a matter of state
law was deeply divisive even in Oregon’s intermediate appellate court.
The nine-member en banc court divided 5–4, producing a majority
opinion, a concurring opinion, and three separate dissents. Together,
the opinions spanned forty pages of the Pacific Reporter. 203
The majority began by observing the sole feature of Oregon’s
justiciability doctrine on which the entire court agreed: “the cases . . .
are murky at best; at times, they are flatly contradictory.” 204 From that
fundamental ambiguity in state law, the majority took license to
“return to first principles,” 205 and to rely on federal caselaw, including
the foundational cases of Hayburn’s Case, 206 Marbury v. Madison, 207 and
The Correspondence of the Justices. 208 The court also analyzed or quoted
liberally from other U.S. Supreme Court cases 209: Muskrat v. United

200
201
202

Utsey, 32 P.3d at 935.
Id.

This framing of the question is also quite similar to that presented in the
petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins: whether
“Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete
harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court,
by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.”
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (No. 131339). The resulting opinion framed the question more narrowly: “whether
respondent Robins has standing to maintain an action in federal court against
petitioner Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.” Spokeo v. Robins,
578 U.S. 330, 333 (2016). For more on the relationship between Spokeo and state
courts, see Thomas B. Bennett, The Paradox of Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction over
Federal Claims, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1211 (2021).
203 See Utsey, 32 P.3d at 933–72.
204 Id. at 936 (majority opinion).
205 Id.
206 Id. (citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 409 (1792)).
207 Id. at 937 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
208 Id. (citing Letter to George Washington (July 20, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE
AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 487 (Henry P. Johnston ed. 1891)).
209 Id. at 937–39.
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States, 210 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 211 Ex Parte Levitt, 212 Coleman v. Miller, 213
Flast v. Cohen, 214 Bennett v. Spear, 215 Lujan, 216 Allen v. Wright, 217 and Warth
v. Seldin. 218 The opinion also looked to the scholarly literature discussing the historical pedigree of federal constitutional standing, 219
including leading articles by Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Raoul Berger, Henry
P. Monaghan, Louis L. Jaffe, Martin H. Redish, Cass R. Sunstein,
Bradley S. Clanton, Gene R. Nichol, Helen Hershkoff, and even a
young John G. Roberts Jr. 220
After canvassing that federal precedent and scholarly literature,
the majority turned abruptly to Oregon precedent with the
observation that “Oregon justiciability doctrine followed a similar path
of development,” despite Oregon’s lack of a case-or-controversy
textual hook. 221 Instead, the majority traced justiciability doctrine to
the state constitution’s grant of “judicial power.” 222 It then sought to
draw a through-line across the state cases in a way that conformed to
the development of standing doctrine in federal courts—with underwhelming persuasiveness. Perhaps to bolster its reading of indeterminate precedent, the majority returned repeatedly to federal
precedent and law review articles throughout its analysis of state law. 223
Ultimately, the majority concluded that the statutory provision at issue
amounted to a “conferral of the right to obtain an advisory opinion,
which is beyond the authority of the legislature to grant,” and that the
League of Women Voters otherwise lacked injury sufficient to grant
standing. 224
The dissenting justices all criticized the majority’s reliance on
federal caselaw. Chief Judge Deits, for example, criticized the majority
for “believ[ing] that its conclusion is driven by federal, as well as
Oregon, case law,” noting that “Oregon courts . . . have never adopted

210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224

Id. at 937 (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)).
Id. at 938 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).
Id. (citing Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937)).
Id. (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)).
Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)).
Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)).
Id. at 939 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
Id. at 937.
See id. at 937 & n.4, 939 n.6, 943 n.9.
Id. at 939.
Id.
See id. at 941 n.8, 944, 945.
Id. at 948.
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the federal approach” to standing. 225 Indeed, Chief Judge Deits
quoted the Oregon Supreme Court’s admonition against the use of
“standing” as a “generic concept,” lest its “‘contours . . . be drawn
indiscriminately from decisions interpreting diverse statutes or U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, or from the academic literature.’“ 226 Judge Armstrong
went further: “[F]ederal standing law is analytically and doctrinally
incoherent and constitutes a body of law that we should reject rather
than embrace under the Oregon Constitution.” 227 And Judge Brewer
took aim at Lujan itself, quoting the leading treatise on federal
administrative law for the proposition that the decision in that case “‘is
more accurately characterized as abdication of judicial responsibility
to enforce the policy decision of a politically accountable Branch.’” 228
The Oregon Supreme Court did not issue a decision on the merits
in Utsey. Though it at first allowed review—i.e., it granted discretionary
appeal—it later dismissed the petition as moot. 229 That left the
intermediate court’s decision in Utsey as the presumptive law of
Oregon, at least until the Supreme Court found an appropriate vehicle
to decide whether to adopt Lujan into state law.
That opportunity arose more than five years later, in Kellas v.
Department of Corrections. 230 That case involved a challenge to Oregon
Department of Corrections’ administrative rules that operated to
deprive the petitioner’s incarcerated adult son of the benefit of time
served as a credit against his sentence. The prisoner’s father sued
under an Oregon statute that authorized “any person” to challenge
“[t]he validity of any rule” by petition to the Court of Appeals. 231 The
Court of Appeals, consistent with its decision in Utsey, raised standing
sua sponte and dismissed the petition for lack of standing. The state
petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review, arguing that the
legislature may authorize any person to “challenge the validity of a
governmental action” no matter if such a challenge would have any
225 Id. at 954 (Deits, C.J., dissenting).
226 Id. at 954–55 (quoting Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers v. Benton Cnty. Bd. of Comm.,
601 P.2d 769, 779 n.8 (1979)) (emphasis added).
227 Id. at 963 n.9 (Armstrong, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 969 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.16 at 95 (3d ed. 1994)).
229 See Utsey v. Coos Cnty., 32 P.3d 933 (Or. 2002) (granting petition of Department
of Land Conservation), petition granted 45 P.3d 449 (Or. 2002) (unpublished table decision)
(League of Women Voters of Coos County), vacating as moot 65 P.3d 1109 (Or. 2003)
(unpublished table decision) (dismissing petitions for review and denying League of
Women Voters’ motion to vacate the decision below); see also Kellas v. Dep’t of Corrections,
145 P.3d 139, 141 n.2 (Or. 2006) (noting that the dismissal was for mootness).
230 145 P.3d 139 (Or. 2006).
231 Id. at 140 (emphasis omitted) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 183.400).
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“practical effect” on the challenger himself. 232 In other words, the
state asked the Supreme Court to overrule Utsey.
The Oregon Supreme Court did just that, ruling unanimously that
the Oregon Constitution imposes no limitations on the legislature’s
ability to confer standing on the public. In so ruling, the court
grappled with the logic and reasoning of Utsey, including the federal
precedent and scholarly material it relied on. The court began by
cataloging the fundamental differences between the federal and
Oregon Constitutions on the question of standing: the lack of a caseor-controversy provision in the latter, the differing lines of caselaw in
their respective courts, and that Oregon courts are free from the
restrictions of Article III. 233 To support its claim of constitutional divergence, the court quoted extensively from a recent law review article
penned by former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde, 234 and
cited approvingly Helen Hershkoff’s landmark work on standing in the
state courts. 235 In the end, though, the court devoted only two
paragraphs to whether federal constitutional law had any bearing on
standing in Oregon courts. The opinion concluded simply: “[W]e
cannot import federal law regarding justiciability into our analysis of
the Oregon Constitution and rely on it to fabricate constitutional
barriers to litigation with no support in either the text or history of
Oregon’s charter of government.” 236
Like Michigan, Oregon’s courts took a circuitous path to rejecting
Lujan: incorporating it at first; rejecting it later. In each case, whether
state courts adopted federal standing doctrine was highly contingent
on the ideological composition of the relevant courts and the
availability of suitable vehicles for deciding the question. But Oregon
adds the wrinkle of long-running uncertainty, in two ways. First, as the
courts in both Utsey and Kellas explicitly acknowledged, the state of
Oregon’s standing doctrine was “murky at best” 237 or “not always . . .
consistent.” 238 That ambiguity left the state’s courts somewhat unconstrained in their choice whether to adopt federal doctrine. Second,
because Oregon’s intermediate appellate court made the initial decision
to incorporate federal doctrine into state law, Oregon’s standing
doctrine existed in a state of limbo, prolonged by the half-decade span
between Utsey and Kellas.
232 Id. at 142.
233 Id. at 142–43.
234 Id. at 143 (quoting Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vive
La Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1287–88 (2005)).
235 Id. (citing Hershkoff, State Courts, supra note 22, at 1905).
236 Id.
237 Utsey v. Coos Cnty, 32 P.3d 933, 936 (Or. 2001).
238 Kellas, 145 P.3d at 143.
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Taken together, the cases from Texas, Michigan, and Oregon
teach three lessons. First, federal precedent no doubt exerts an
agenda-setting power on state law as developed by state appellate
courts. In states that reject federal doctrine, the choice whether to
accept such rules structures and influences the development of state
law. On the other hand, in states that adopt federal doctrine despite
dramatically different constitutional text, the attractive force of federal
doctrine is plain to see.
Second, state courts typically lack the institutional ability to accept
or reject federal law in a given area wholesale and for all time, meaning
that federal law renders state law perpetually contestable between two
poles. A state’s decision whether to adopt Lujan does not necessarily
decide whether they should adopt future Supreme Court standing
precedent. Such a decision also cannot decide whether the state
should continue to adopt Lujan. Oregon and Michigan show concretely
how parties litigate standing in state courts in the shadow of federal
precedent.
Third, they highlight the role that ideology and politics play in
forcing states to grapple with federal caselaw. It is likely no coincidence that the authors of the principal opinions in Texas Ass’n of
Businesses were judges who would later be a U.S. Senator and a U.S.
Representative, respectively. Nor is it likely a coincidence that the
intermediate appellate judge who favored restrictive standing—but
was overruled in Detroit Firefighters—later adopted federal standing
doctrine into Michigan law after his elevation to the Michigan
Supreme Court. Nor should you be surprised at this point to learn that
the author of the intermediate appellate opinion adopting Lujan into
Oregon law later won election to the Oregon Supreme Court.
Standing is a salient and ideologically charged issue, and therefore
state actors may use it to signal their commitments or may simply feel
genuinely strongly about it.
III.

THE DETERMINANTS OF STATE REJECTION

This Part explores the causal explanations and normative
implications of state law’s rejection of federal law. First, Section A
traces the factors that cause—and those that do not cause—state law
to reject federal law. Section B turns to practical lessons and normative
implications for federal courts, on the one hand, and legal reformers,
on the other.
A. Determinants of Rejection
By analyzing this evidence of state rejection of federal law in
comparative context we can see the similarities and common causes
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that drive this phenomenon across different areas of the law. Broadly
there are two key sets of reasons why states can and do reject federal
caselaw. One set is the residue of structural features of our system of
federated and separated powers. The other set stems from political
dynamics.
The two causal factors I focus on are: (1) the relevant federal laws,
which determine how free states are to reject federal law; (2) the
political motivations of the relevant state actors. Just as important to
this story, however, are the non-causes—that is, factors you might
expect to matter but that in fact do not. These are (3) the degree of
similarity between the texts of the federal and state laws; and (4) the
identity of the state actor deciding whether to follow or reject federal
law.
1. Conflicts and Supremacy
State law is not always free to depart from federal law. Indeed, the
history of states’ attempts to reject or otherwise nullify federal law is
fraught with conflict and bloodshed. 239 The longstanding interpretation of the Supremacy Clause 240—often challenged but never
upended—is that federal law always trumps state law whenever they
conflict, and that decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court constitute the
definitive and final interpretation of federal law. Given this constitutional settlement, state law can depart from federal law by two factors:
the structural limits on the scope of federal law (i.e., the principle of
enumerated powers) and federal actors’ forbearance from creating law
that would preempt state law.
The Supremacy Clause does not mean, however, that states lack
the power to reject federal law as a model. It is merely to say that states
may only do so when federal law leaves states room to set their own
239 See, e.g., Resolutions Adopted by the Kentucky General Assembly, Nov. 10, 1798 in
30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 550–56 (Barbara B. Oberg ed. 2003) (proposing
doctrines of nullification and interposition); Virginia Resolutions, Dec. 21, 1798 in 17 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 185–91 (David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg, Jeanne K. Cross & Susan
Holbrok eds., 1991) (same); United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809) (rejecting
doctrine of nullification); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738
(1824) (rendering unconstitutional state law in direct opposition to Supreme Court
constitutional ruling); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding
unconstitutional state law contradicting federal authority over Indian affairs); JOHN C.
CALHOUN, SOUTH CAROLINA EXPOSITION AND PROTEST (1828); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41
U.S. (14 Pet.) 539 (1842); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (15 How.) 506 (1858); DECLARATION
OF THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES WHICH INDUCE AND JUSTIFY THE SECESSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FROM THE FEDERAL UNION (1860) (citing northern states’ attempts to nullify fugitive slave
laws as a reason for purported secession); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (again
rejecting doctrine of nullification).
240 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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rules. The Supremacy Clause is a rule of conflicts that teaches us to
look first to federal law when resolving apparent disagreements with
state law. But when federal law runs out, state law is authoritative
within its domain.
At one extreme, federal preemption in any of its guises robs states
of the power to set any substantive law. In these cases, state law cannot
depart from federal law. Indeed, federal preemption negates the very
possibility of independent state law. This end of the spectrum
includes, among other subjects, patents and admiralty law. At this
extreme, then, state law can neither follow nor reject federal law.
At the other extreme are cases in which states’ freedom to depart
from federal law will be obvious and uncontroversial. Federal law
allows capital punishment, but many states do not. Federal law has an
income tax, but several states do not. Federal law permits sports
gambling, but many states do not. These are all cases in which the
separate spheres of federal and state regulation are well defined and
largely nonproblematic.
In other cases, the path left for states to chart their own courses
will be more obscure. Consider antitrust. Federal antitrust law
commits to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the federal courts all
civil actions arising under the federal antitrust laws. 241 Yet states
remain free to pass their own antitrust laws, so long as they do not
conflict with their federal analogs. 242 Because of these ostensibly
separate spheres, even when states did depart from federal law
historically, they did so only for purely intrastate cases—i.e., cases that
federal law did not reach. 243 As the scope of the federal Commerce
Clause power expanded at the same time as the extraterritorial
regulatory power of state law did, there was increasing overlap in the
substantive reach of state and federal antitrust laws. As we saw in Part
II, it was that overlap that gave states a meaningful opportunity to reject
federal antitrust doctrine in a meaningful way.
Once federal law grants states the autonomy to reject federal
caselaw, they face the pragmatic question of whether they should do
so. Many state courts have developed doctrinal tests to decide when to
reject interpretations of federal constitutional provisions that are

241 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a).
242 See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1981); see also California v. ARC
Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101, 103–06 (1988) (upholding state Illinois Brick repealer statute
over preemption challenge).
243 Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 379 (1983)
(analyzing the importance of the extent of sovereignty and the relationship between federal
and state antitrust law).
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similar to those of the state constitution. 244 Other states’ apex courts
treat U.S. Supreme Court precedent no differently “than opinions
from sister states construing a similar clause.” 245 Still others adhere to
a rigid lockstep approach, even in the face of divergent constitutional
or statutory text. 246
The lesson here is that the extent and nature of federal law
enables and structures state law’s attempts to grapple with that same
body of federal law. When federal law preempts state law across the
board both substantively and jurisdictionally (as it does with, say,
patents), state law simply has nothing to say in response to federal law.
But where federal law falls short of complete preemption, states have
room to set a different course by interpreting their own laws in
contradiction to federal doctrine. Exactly how much room, however,
will be set by federal law.
2. Politics
Candor requires recognizing another factor driving federal law’s
influence on state law: politics. Much law and doctrine has an
ideological valence and salience. Sometimes that salience is strongest
among partisan actors, while other times it is most acute among
discrete but powerful interest groups. Other provisions of law are
salient and meaningful to the public at large. In these cases, political
dynamics or simple political disagreement may drive state law to reject
federal doctrine.

244 See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965–67 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring)
(announcing seven factors to be considered); State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 653–59 (N.J.
1983) (adopting the Hunt factors by a majority).
Robert F. Williams has identified several other states in addition to New Jersey—
Washington, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Connecticut—as adopting similar
“divergence factors.” See Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing
Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1021–39 (1997); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986);
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa.
1991); People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1984); State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1232–34
(Conn. 1992).
Williams rightly criticizes the “divergence factors” approach on the grounds that it
challenges the legitimacy of state constitutions: “it is not a valid argument to say that a state
constitution should not be interpreted to provide against . . . warrantless searches because the
United States Supreme Court has already held that the Federal Constitution is not violated by
such searches, based on its national view of ‘reasonableness.’” Williams, supra note 244, at
1046.
245 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 1–43 (2006) (collecting cases).
246 See id. at 1-45–1-46 (citing Press, Inc. v. Veran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 442 (Tenn. 1978)).
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This seemingly obvious fact derives from a surprisingly large
number of variables. Let us focus on three of the most important ones:
constituency, independence, and ambition. First, even if the U.S.
Supreme Court has a constituency, it is national rather than
regional. 247 By contrast, state legislatures and courts have constituencies that include, at most, the individual state. 248 Individual states have
considerably different demographics and political preferences from
the nation, and state politicians and judges will reflect those
differences. Differing constituencies alone can drive state law to reject
federal doctrine, such as when the Supreme Court is relatively liberal,
and a state is relatively conservative. It can also explain divergence in
the more limited case when the powerful interest groups that sway
opinion on the Supreme Court differ from the powerful interest
groups that sway the votes of state legislators or judges.
Second, the political independence of state actors varies
considerably from that of federal actors. This is particularly true in the
cases of judges, who in the federal system enjoy independence bred
not only of a system of appointment rather than election but also life
tenure. By contrast, most state judges both lack life tenure and must
stand for regular election. But it is also true of state legislators, whose
terms in office are generally shorter than those of U.S. Senators, 249
whose salaries are much lower than federal legislators, and who
generally rely on outside groups for much of their work product

247 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009) (arguing that the
Supreme Court is politically responsive to national political preferences); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Supreme Court as Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1978) (theorizing
that the Supreme Court’s constituency comprises lower courts, academics, intelligentsia,
the organized bar, administrative agencies, interest groups, and elective officeholders).
248 Of the states that use elections as a mode of judicial selection or retention, most
(Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) hold at-large elections, in which each
seat is filled by the statewide electorate. A minority (Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Dakota) use at least some district
elections, in which each justice represents a geographical subdivision of the state. See
National Center for State Courts, Methods of Judicial Selection, NAT’L CENT. STATE CTRS.
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm
[https://perma.cc/Q8PX-LCSK].
249 The longest term for any state’s senate is four years. See Length of Terms of State
Senators, BALLOTPEDIA https://ballotpedia.org/Length_of_terms_of_state_senators [https://
perma.cc/DK2J-EHW4]. Fifteen states also have term limits for legislative seats. See State
Legislatures with Term Limits, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_legislatures_with
_term_limits (surveying such limits, which vary from six years to sixteen years, with eight
years being most common) [https://perma.cc/7HXN-ZKLG].
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because they lack the institutional resources to legislate without that
assistance. And in any event, the relevant comparison is between state
legislators and the U.S. Supreme Court, and there the relative gap in
political independence is even starker. This comparative lack of
independence has the practical effect of making states more likely to
reject federal doctrine when that doctrine is politically unpopular
either with electoral majorities in the state or among powerful interest
groups at the state level.
Third, state actors’ ambition to win federal office or appointment
to the federal bench may make them especially likely to reject federal
doctrine to signal to partisan groups their ideological sympathies in
national political battles. Even for actors who seek higher state office,
this sort of ideological signaling can help. This dynamic is especially
apparent in the battles over state standing to sue, where many of the
state judges debating the wisdom of adopting federal doctrine later
held federal elective office or higher state judicial posts. For example,
in the Texas Supreme Court, as we saw, the judges who wrote the
principal opinions on this issue then became a U.S. Senator and a U.S.
Representative, respectively. 250 In Oregon and Michigan, judges who
grappled with this issue as intermediate appellate judges would vindicate their earlier lower-court opinions after they assumed positions as
state supreme court judges. In these cases, state law provided a forum
to relitigate federal issues, serving as a signal to potential political
patrons and constituencies of state judges’ ideological sympathies.
Similarly, it was an ambitious young legislator who drove Florida’s
legislative reaction to Kelo: Marco Rubio. Here too we can reasonably
link the desire to reject federal law with future political ambition.
Of course, politics can only provide an external explanation, not
an internal legal reason, for why states reject federal law. Indeed, many
state courts and scholars reject the idea that state law should be used
as a “cute trick” to evade the U.S. Supreme Court. 251 But even without
impugning the motivations of state court judges, we can recognize that
there may not be a clear line between judicial politics and interpretive
method. And in any event, no such insistence on the separation of law
and politics exists in state legislatures or the ballot box, where many
instances of state rejection play out.
The political dimension of state rejection of federal law also has
important consequences for the stability of state law. If state law is
250 See infra subsection II.C.5.
251 See Williams, supra note 244, at 1016–17; H.C. Macgill, Upon a Peak in Darien:
Discovering the Connecticut Constitution, 15 CONN. L. REV. 7, 9 (1982) (“There probably
remains some feeling on the bench as well as in the bar that a state constitutional holding
is something of a cute trick, if not a bit of nose-thumbing at the federal Supreme Court,
and not ‘real’ constitutional law at all.”).
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merely a means for state actors to telegraph their future political
positions, it will tend to be unstable and perpetually contested. And
because states often see themselves as facing a binary choice between
the extremes of accepting or rejecting federal doctrine wholesale, that
instability can result not in moderation but in cycling between
extremes. That sort of instability can be particularly costly where we
think the law ought to provide a stable backdrop against which private
actors can plan their affairs.
3. Textual Convergence and Divergence
Unlike the first few causal factors identified above, consider the
next two factors: non-causes. Though one might expect them to
matter, a priori, the case studies examined here show they have
surprisingly little effect on whether states reject federal precedent.
Consider the first non-cause: the degree of similarity between the
text of relevant laws. Many state laws mirror federal statutes to varying
degrees. At one extreme, many states have Unfair and Deceptive Acts
and Practices statutes modeled explicitly after the Federal Trade
Commission Act—so much so that they are colloquially known as “baby
FTC acts.” 252 Similarly, many states have passed whistleblower statutes
that mirror the federal False Claims Act. 253 In these cases, it should be
no surprise that the state laws are often interpreted in lockstep with
their federal analogs. Indeed, in some cases state statutes direct state
courts to so interpret them. 254
Yet ironically, textual similarity can also be a key driver of state
rejection of federal law. It is in these cases in which the text and interpretive history is identical that a state’s departure from federal law
becomes most obvious, and therefore most important. If federal and
state law have followed the same path for decades, their divergence
becomes a watershed. As we saw in Part II, this exact pattern played
252 See, e.g., Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Report on Unfair
and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, NATI’L CONSUMER L. CTR. INC. (2009), https://
www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9GQ-XVCD];
Alex Brown, FTC’s Ability to Regulate Data Security Potentially Limited in FTC v. LabMD,
ALSTON & BIRD: PRIVACY, CYBER & DATA STRATEGY BLOG (Nov. 19, 2015), https://
www.alstonprivacy.com/ftc-jurisdiction-in-data-security-regulation-potentially-limited-in-ftcv-labmd/ [https://perma.cc/8GJA-LGH].
253 See Tim Barnett, Overview of State Whistleblower Protection Statutes, 43 LABOR L. J. 440
(1992).
254 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16721.6 (West 2021) (“It is the intent of the
legislature that [relevant provisions of California’s Cartwright Act, its state antitrust statute]
be interpreted and applied so as not to conflict with federal law with respect to transactions
in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States . . . .”); see also Lindsay, supra
note 59 (collecting cases and statutes directing state courts to harmonize interpretation of
state antitrust statutes with that of federal antitrust statutes).
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out in the context of antitrust’s indirect-purchaser rule and eminent
domain’s economic use doctrine. The fact that antitrust laws are
treated as “common law” statutes only further underscores the point.
If textual similarity can prove a surprising wellspring of state law
departures from federal law, textual dissimilarity can prove an equally
unlikely source of doctrinal convergence between state and federal law.
In these cases, state law chooses to borrow federal doctrine even with
no textual license for doing so. Of course, this is a pattern more of
borrowing than of rejection—but it reveals that text underdetermines
whether states reject federal models.
But even when the texts of the relevant federal and state law are
different, rejection is still possible and notable. Indeed, once a state
yokes itself to federal law, it creates the very conditions that make its
rejection of federal law notable and important. Just as with identical
statutory text, voluntary lockstepping of state law to federal law creates
a shared path, and it is the knowing departure from that shared path
that generates salient difference. This is an important lesson of the
experiences of Oregon and Michigan in grappling with the Supreme
Court’s precedent in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.
4. Sites of Decision: Courts Versus Legislatures
Another non-cause is whether the relevant state actor tasked with
deciding whether to follow or reject federal law is a court, a legislature,
or the electorate at large. When the Supreme Court elaborates some
aspect of federal law—whether constitutional or statutory—states often
have the latitude to accept or reject that federal doctrine by statute,
judicial interpretation, or ballot initiative. 255 When the Supreme Court
restricts the availability of a private cause of action alleging violations
of federal antitrust law, states can reject that restrictive turn either
through: (a) legislatures, by amending their state antitrust statutes; or
(b) courts, by interpreting their state antitrust statutes not to include
any such restrictive statutory standing requirement. Similarly, when
the Supreme Court loosens restrictions on local governments’ ability
to seize private property through eminent domain under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, states can reject that expansive
reading within their own borders either through (a) legislatures, by
passing statutes that bar state actors from using eminent domain in
that way; (b) courts, by interpreting Takings Clause analogs found in
most state constitutions not to countenance sweeping economic-use
justifications for eminent domain; or (c) electorates, by passing ballot
255 See supra Section I.C. As discussed in Part I, the freedom to reject federal doctrine
depends on the structure and form of that supreme law; states are free to reject federal law
only to the extent permitted by federal law.
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initiatives, including constitutional amendments, that enact similar
limits. In each of these examples, both the impetus (federal doctrine)
and the result (rejection of federal doctrine) are the same—despite
the important institutional differences between the relevant state
decisionmakers.
Of course, depending on which actor undertakes the decision, the
form of the resulting rejection of federal law will differ slightly. State
legislatures have the power only to enact statutory law, while state
courts have the final power to declare state constitutional doctrine. As
a result, when courts do reject federal doctrine, they can insulate the
rejection from override by the state legislature. Yet courts are also
somewhat more constrained by state precedent and constitutional text,
while legislatures are mostly free to legislate as they see fit. And where
legislatures have mandated that state statutes be interpreted in
lockstep with federal interpretations of analogous federal laws, 256 only
legislatures have the power to reject federal doctrine in statutory cases.
Yet the examples assayed above reflect similarities across state
rejections of federal law, no matter if it is legislatures or courts who do
it. Indeed, in some cases, different states will reject the same federal
doctrine either by legislation or court decision, proving that a similar
dynamic is in play regardless of the state institution that carries it out.
B. Lessons of State Rejection of Federal Law
With this broader picture of the factors that lead states to reject
federal caselaw, it is possible to draw lessons for decisionmakers. This
Section takes up that task, suggesting takeaways for both federal courts
and legal reformers.
1. Lessons for Federal Courts
Because federal courts are the ones who spur state rejection in the
first place, this phenomenon teaches them two key lessons.
First, when federal courts invite states to respond to their
decisions by charting their own course, states often do so. In Kelo, the
Supreme Court “emphasize[d] that nothing in [its] opinion
preclude[d] any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise
of the takings power.” 257 And as we have seen, many states did so.
Similarly, in ASARCO v. Kadish, the Court reminded state courts that
they are “not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other
256 See, e.g., supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing lockstepping provision
of California’s Cartwright Act).
257 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
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federal rules of justiciability” like standing. 258 And as we have seen,
many state courts took that reminder to heart by rejecting federal
caselaw elaborating on standing doctrine. Finally, in California v. ARC
America Corp., the Court made clear that the indirect-purchaser rule of
Illinois Brick did nothing to preclude states from allowing indirectpurchaser suits under state antitrust laws. 259 And as we have seen, many
more states responded to the Court’s invitation in ARC America by
passing new Illinois Brick repealer statutes. So if federal courts see value
in leaving significant room for state law to stand alongside federal law,
they would be wise to include explicit statements to that effect in
judicial opinions.
Second, because many sensitive legal and policy areas require
balancing many competing considerations under conditions of
uncertainty, state rejection of federal law allows federal courts to
gather information about the best rule. For example, a primary
motivation for Illinois Brick was the concern that allocating damages
between different classes of plaintiffs would be difficult and costly. But
the Court was largely speculating, as it could not predict with
confidence whether that difficulty would manifest. The experience of
Illinois Brick repealer states gives federal courts new information about
how difficult and costly such damages calculations are in real-world
cases, including cases in federal court. Should the Supreme Court
revisit the Illinois Brick rule, it will have the benefit of those states’
experience, which may enable it to make a better-informed decision. 260
This factor therefore suggests that federal courts should consider
whether the prospect of state rejection may offer important benefits
for the development of sound law and policy.
2. Lessons for Legal Reformers
For those who despair of losses in federal courts, the lesson here
is simple. In many areas, state law has considerable flexibility to reject
federal caselaw. The examples discussed in Part II show the breadth
of this phenomenon, which spans individual liberties (Kelo), private
causes of action (Illinois Brick), and jurisdiction (Lujan). For those
258 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).
259 490 U.S. 93, 105–06 (1989) (“When viewed properly, Illinois Brick was a decision
construing the federal antitrust laws, not a decision defining the interrelationship between
the federal and state antitrust laws. The congressional purposes on which Illinois Brick was
based provide no support for a finding that state indirect purchaser statutes are pre-empted
by federal law.”).
260 Such an overruling is not unfathomable. Indeed, the dissenting opinion in the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Apple Inc. v. Pepper, accused the majority of “whittling
[Illinois Brick] away to a bare formalism.” 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1531 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
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pursuing legal change despite obstacles under federal law, then, state
law offers a promising path forward.
The idea here is not that state law somehow holds more promise
than federal law. Neither federal law nor state is inherently more rights
protective than the other. The key is that each is an independent site
of political and legal contestation, and that narrow focus on only the
federal forum obscures how state law can bring about legal change.
Recent efforts to reject the doctrine of qualified immunity as a
matter of state law make the point well. Most of these efforts, including
Colorado’s recent SB-217, achieve their goal in two steps. First, they
create a cause of action under state law that guarantees individual
rights at least capacious as those found under the U.S. Constitution. 261
Second, they explicitly state that qualified immunity is no defense to
that new cause of action. 262
As noted in the introduction, as a formal or technical matter, this
two-step process does not repeal qualified immunity. Yet as a practical
matter, this state law rejection of the body of federal caselaw that
created qualified immunity doctrine does almost everything that a
repeal of qualified immunity would do. First, and most importantly, it
ensures that victims can recover for their injuries. Second, it provides
a financial disincentive for violating the law. Third, it prompts courts
to delineate and define individual rights rather than avoiding those
hard issues by dismissing on qualified immunity grounds.
Just as with the other examples explored above, state courts, along
with legislatures, have also shown willingness to reject qualified
immunity. For example, the California Court of Appeals has held that
the defense of qualified immunity is unavailable when plaintiffs sue
state and local officials under California Civil Code § 52.1, 263 which
resembles § 1983 in many ways. 264 In concluding that the defense was
261 In Colorado’s case, the law created a cause of action for money damages for any
violation of Colorado’s Bill of Rights. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131(1) (2021); see also
COLO. CONST. art II. Colorado’s Bill of Rights contains many individual rights that are
identical to their federal analogues, as well as additional rights not found in the U.S.
Constitution. See id. An alternative would be to create a state law cause of action for money
damages for any violation of federal rights, including federal constitutional rights. This
would guarantee that the law would be at least as protective as the rights under the U.S.
Constitution without requiring any amendment of the state constitution.
262 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131(2)(b) (2021) (“Qualified immunity is not a defense
to liability pursuant to this section.”).
263 See Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741, 751–54 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
264 Importantly, however, section 52.1 covers both public and private conduct, but only
does so to the extent that a defendant attempts to or in fact “interferes by threat,
intimidation, or coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment . . . of rights . . . .” CAL. CIV.
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unavailable, the court focused on the different enacting history, text,
and subsequent judicial gloss to find reason to reject the federal doctrine. 265 Though some state courts have embraced qualified immunity
even as a matter of state law, 266 their very grappling with the issue
suggests the issue may not be settled. 267 And, of course, legal reformers
can take their case directly to state legislatures if they lose in the courts.
This is not an exhaustive playbook for reformers looking to use
state law to push back on the retrenchment of federal remedies for
violating civil rights. But it does set out a few key plays that may be
useful: focus on both rights and remedies, make the case both in courts
and in legislatures, and an initial loss is not the end.
CONCLUSION
The folklore of federal law’s supremacy has impoverished the
collective imagination about state law’s potential. By documenting
many ways in which state law has rejected federal judicial opinions, this
Article sought to challenge that folklore and replace it with a more
sophisticated account of judicial federalism. At the same time, the
changes in state law documented here teach concrete lessons for
federal courts and reformers alike not to overlook the possible
reaction that state law may have to federal judicial opinions.

CODE § 52.1(b)–(c) (West 2021). Additionally, it provides a cause of action for interference
with rights guaranteed either by federal law or California law. See id.
265 Venegas, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 751–54.
266 See, e.g., Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Mass. 1989) (reasoning that by
patterning the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act after § 1983, the Massachusetts legislature
intended to incorporate the immunities available under § 1983 into the state law cause of
action).
267 See supra nn.4–11 and accompanying text (explaining how state law that is defined
by relation to federal law is difficult to settle once and for all).
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